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NOTES
CONNECTICUT v DOEHR AND PROCEDURAL
DUE PROCESS VALUES: THE SNIADACH
TETRAD REVISITED
INTRODUCTION

When the Supreme Court addressed the prejudgment remedy1
case of Connecticut v. Doeh- in the October 1990 Term, it grappled
with the Sniadach tetrad,3 a line of precedent that meandered across
the due process constitutional law landscape leaving a trail of invalidated state statutes and confused lower courts. Prior to Doehr,various
commentators attempted, with little success, to harmonize the tetrad's
1 The prejudgment remedy area of law refers to various provisional creditors' remedies including attachment, sequestration, replevin, and repossession.
Attachment [is t]he legal process of seizing another's property in accordance with a writ or judicial order for the purpose of securing satisfaction of
ajudgment yet to be rendered.... The remedy of attachment is governed
strictly by state statutes, with such differing considerably as to when attachment is available (the majority of states providing that such is available at or
after the commencement of the main action until entry of judgment).
BLACK'S LAW DIcriONARY 126 (6th ed. 1990).

Sequestration... [is] the process by which property or funds are attached
pending the outcome of litigation.... In the law of creditors' rights, [it]
most often refers to an equitable form of attachment, although occasionally
used (or misused) to identify a replevin-like process.
Id. at 1366.
Replevin [is a]n action whereby the owner or person entitled to repossession of goods or chattels may recover those goods or chattels from one who
has wrongfully distrained or taken or who wrongfully detains such goods or
chattels. [It a]lso refers to a provisional remedy that is an incident of a
replevin action which allows the plaintiff at any time before judgment to
take the disputed property from the defendant and hold the property
pendente lite.
Id. at 1299.
Repossession [is the action of] recover[ing] goods sold on credit or in installments when the buyer fails to pay for them. [As a self-help measure
without state action it is governed by] U.C.C. § 9-503. [However,] the conditions for repossession are entirely statutory and due process standards
must be met ....
Id. at 1301.
2 501 U.S. 1 (1991).
3 The Sniadach tetrad includes the following cases: Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp. of
Bay View, 395 U.S. 337 (1969); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Mitchell v. W.T.
Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); and North Georgia Finishing, inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc. 419
U.S. 601 (1975). With the addition of Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1 (1991), the tetrad
becomes the Sniadach quintad.

1603

1604

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79:1603

seemingly disparate rulings. 4 Others, including the Justices themselves, explained the disparate rulings in part in terms of changes in
Court personnel. 5 Whatever the reason, the tetrad produced an unclear and perhaps even internally contradictory constitutional
6
standard.
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. of Bay View,7 the first in the line of
cases, invalidated a state garnishment statute that failed to provide
prior notice and hearing to the garnished wage earner. The decision
apparently established a "brutal need" exception to the traditional
8
creditors' remedies.
The next two cases seemed to contradict one another. Fuentes v.
Shevin9 extended Sniadach to require predeprivation process for repossession of consumer goods. A narrow exception covered "extraordinary circumstances."'10 Two years later, the Court in Mitchell v. WT.
Grant Co." upheld a repossession statute because of the alternative
safeguards it provided. 12 Given the factual similarity to Fuentes, members of the Court suggested that the attempt to distinguish Mitchellwas
3
flawed and that, in fact, Fuentes had been overruled.'
4 See infra part II. See also Alison Dunham, Due Process and Commercial Law, 1972 Sup.
Or. REv. 135 (1972) (a pre-MitcheU, pre-Di-Chem article finding that it is the fact that a
private actor chooses to take advantage of court-authorized process to limit personal liability for seizure that requires that the person who bears the consequence of the proceeding
be given prior notice and opportuuity for hearing); Richard S. Kay & Harold M. Lubin,
Making Sense of the Prejudgment Seizure Cases, 64 Ky. LJ. 705 (1976) (seeking to harmonize
the tetrad through an extension of the Fuentes extraordinary circumstauce exception to

encompass Mitchell); William F. Newton & Durward E. Timmons, Fuentes "Repossessed, 26
BAYLOR L. REv. 469 (1974) (suggesting that Mitchell relegated Fuentes to its specific fact
pattern by allowiug alternative safeguarding mechanisms to replace the need for prior notice and hearing); Steve H. Nickles, Creditors' ProvisionalRemedies and Debtors' Due Process
Rights: Attachment and Garnishment in Arkansas, 31 Am L. REv. 607 (1978); Doug Rendleman, The New Due Process: Rights and Remedies, 63 Ky. LJ.531 (1975) (suggesting that the
Court's "dual interest analysis" is applicable when a creditor holds a consensually agreed
written security interest in the attached property); Robert E. Scott, ConstitutionalRegulation
of ProvisionalCreditorRemedies: The Cost of ProceduralDue Process, 61 VA. L. REV. 807 (1975)
(suggesting that the Sniadach tetrad cases display an inconsistent understanding of the requirements of due process and emphasize factors that do not significantly increase the
accuracy of the decision or the protection of the debtor's interest).
5 Justice Blackmun, dissenting in Di-Chem, suggested that "Fuentes, a constitutional
decision, obviously should not have been brought down and decided by a 4-3 vote when
there were two vacancies on the Court at the time of argument." Di-Chem, 419 U.S. at 616
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
6
See discussion infra part II.
7 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
8 See discussion infra part 1.A.
9 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
10 See infra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
11 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
12 Id. at 609-10.
13 Compare id. at 623 (Powell,J., concurring) with id. at 634-35 (StewartJ., dissenting,
joined by Douglas & Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
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14
The Court's next decision in North GeorgiaFinishingv. Di-Chem,
however, invalidated ex partegarnishment of a corporate bank account
to recover the purchase price of goods. Di-Chem could be interpreted
as an application of Mitchell: because the statutory safeguards did not
match those in Mitchell predeprivation process was necessary. Yet the
Court explicitly relied on Fuentes as precedent.15
After a hiatus of more than fifteen years, the Court provided another perspective on the due process standards for prejudgment remedies in the unanimous Connecticut v. Doehr decision. 16 The Doehr
Court required notice and hearing prior to attachment of real property to secure a potential judgment in an unrelated tort action. 17 The
Justices modified an interest balancing test introduced in Mathews v.
Eldridge,18 an administrative law entitlements case. 19
This Note suggests that the Mathews-Doehrtest provides the missing clue to the puzzle of prejudgment remedies, permitting a synthesis of the apparently discrete rules and exceptions derived from the
Sniadachtetrad. Part I reviews the cornerstone cases in the context of
the Supreme Court's changing analysis of poverty. Part II summarizes
several commentators' interpretations of the procedural due process
standard for prejudgment remedies. Part III discusses the facts and
holding of the Doehr case, and the Justices' varying approaches to
bonding, exigent circumstances, and preexisting interests. Part IV
contends that the Doehr modification of the Mathews test underscores
the constitutional values of procedural due process and elucidates the
principle that harmonizes the provisional remedy cases. The resulting

14
15
16

North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
See infra note 126 and accompanying text.
501 U.S. 1 (1991). Although the decision itself was unanimous, there remained

some disagreement concerning the constitutional necessity of bonding provisions. Compare Sections IV and V of the opinion of the ourtjoined by only four of theJustices, id. at
18-24 (finding a bond constitutionally required) with the ChiefJustice's concurring opinion, id. at 26-29 (Rehnquist, CJ.,joined by Blackmun,J., concurring) (abstaining from the
constitutional question regarding bonding provisions).
The opinions also illustrate the Court's inability or unwillingness to speak clearly
about key concepts in the Sniadach quintad such as preexisting creditor interests, exigent
circumstances, and alternative safeguards. Compare id, at 2114 (White, J., opinion of the
Court) with id. at 2123 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
17 For the first time, the Court applied an interest balancing test to traditional property interests in land-in this case, the interest of an owner in unclouded title to his home.
Id. at 2109.
18 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (finding that the termination of social security disability benefits deprives a person of a protected property interest and that the appropriate deprivation
procedure is determined by weighing the government's interest and risk of erroneous deprivation against the individual's interest).
19 The procedural due process analysis suggested here posits the central importance
of the modification of the Mathews test in understanding the provisional remedy cases.
The judicial process of analogy allows the Court to move gradually through a field of law
establishing a pattern perceptible only by looking at the whole. See discussion infra part
IV.A.3-4.
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"more vulnerable" rule is also consistent with the Court's analysis of
quasi in rem attachment jurisdiction and suggests that such jurisdiction should not be available unless the plaintiff can show a compelling
need.
I
THE CORNERSTONE CASES

A primary rationale supporting state provisional remedies 20 is to
encourage credit by easing the burden of debt collection and protecting creditors from defaulting debtors. 2 1 The state also has an interest
in protecting its judicial process and resources by insuring that suffi22
cient funds are available to satisfy adjudicated claims.
Countering these creditor-related interests, however, is the concern that the state not provide unfair coercive assistance to creditors
20 These statutes are primarily remedies for creditors, although they may be used to
secure jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. See discussion infra part IV.B. Attachment is perhaps the most general term, covering court authorization to a private party to
seize property in the possession of another private party for the purpose of satisfying a
potential judgment against the defendant. Attachment is most frequently used by creditors to secure property of a debtor by creating a provisional lien. If the creditor is successful on the underlying claim, the asset is liquidated to pay the creditor's judgment award.
THOMAS D. CRANDALL ET AL., DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAw MANUAL,
6.04 [1] (1985 & 1990
Cum. Supp. No. 2). Garnishment is an attachment of the defendant's property that is
controlled by a third party, such as funds held in a bank account. STANLEY MORGANSTERN,
LEGAL PROTECTION IN GARNISHMENT AND ATTACHMENT 1-3 (1971). Attachment was historically limited to actions on contracts or based on security interests in a particular chattel
and was not ordinarily available to seize property to satisfy ajudgment in tort actions. Id. at
70. Susan S. Blasik, H.B. 254: Changesin Ohio'sAttachment, Replevin and GarnishmentStatutes,
8 U. DAYTON L. REV. 407 (1983), discusses fully the various actions.
Historically, English common law required the defendant to be within the jurisdiction
of the court. MORGANSTERN, supra, at 68. Modem attachment statutes, however, frequently
allow attachment to secure quasi in rem jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. See,
e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-278e(a) (2) (A).
Note that the covered actions involve the assistance at some level of a law enforcement
officer. They contrast with the provisions under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code for peaceable self-help measures of repossession without the involvement of law enforcement officers. U.C.C. § 9-503 (1993). Such self-help does not involve the requisite
state action to bring the proceedings under the protection of the Due Process Clause. See
Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978) (finding that the state action requirement
is not met in a warehouseman's lien sale of a debtor's stored property in which the only
state involvement is the statute authorizing the sale). See Rendleman, supra note 4, at 56368, for further discussion of self-help repossession.
21 "The assurance of protection from the consequences of debtor default is a fundamental necessity in the commercial world, whose order depends upon the predictability of
the debtor-creditor relationship and the realization of reasonable expectations." Special
Project, Recent Developments in CommericialLaw, 11 RUT.-CAM. LJ. 527, 657 (1980) [hereinafter PreudgmentAttachment]. See also Barry L. Zaretsky, Attachment without Seizure: A Proposal
for a New Creditor's Remedy, 1978 U. 1LL. L.F. 819, 825 (1978).
22
See, e.g., Amicus Brief for the National Legal Aid and Defender Association at 13,
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (No. 70-6060), reprintedin NATIONAL LEGAL AID AND
DEFENDER ASSOCIATION, DUE PROCESS IN CONSUMER AFFAIRS AFTER SNIADACH (Michael G.
West & Howard T. Reben eds., 1971) [hereinafter Amicus Brief].
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who use the process to manipulate innocent debtors. Debtors-especially those without recourse to legal assistance-may be particularly
susceptible in installment contract purchases:
[A]n unscrupulous merchant can continue an account until a major portion of the debt is paid and then take advantage of a minor
default, which may be prompted by the merchandise being defective or provoked by acceleration of payments, in order to repossess
the purchased merchandise. After repossession the merchant can
resell the goods and charge his costs and legal expenses against the
proceeds while retaining the right to sue the buyer for any
23
deficiencies.
If attachment remedies do not provide appropriate safeguards against
abuse, consumers may be pressured to pay the purchase price rather
than pursue a claim against the creditor for faulty devices or for failure to provide services as contracted. 24 Thus, consumer advocates,
especially those working with the poor, have sought strict limitations
25
on the availability of summary procedures.
The four cases 26 that establish the procedural due process framework for prejudgment remedies27 were considered within six years of
each other, from 1969 to 1975. They addressed state statutory provi28
sions for judicial authority for prejudgment property seizure.
A.

29
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. of Bay View

In Sniadach, the Court invalidated a Wisconsin procedure that allowed a garnisher to freeze up to half an employee's income without
prior notice or hearing.3 0 The garnishment could only be lifted if the
employee won at trial on the merits of the underlying claim. 3 1
Although conceding that "[a] procedural rule ... may satisfy due proAmicus Brief, supra note 22, at 8.
See Dean Gloster, Comment, Abuse of Process and Attachment: Toward a Balance of
Power, 30 UCLA L. REV. 1218 (1983) (suggesting that attachment proceedings generate
leverage on debtors to settle regardless of the merits of the underlying creditor claim). But
see Zaretsky, supra note 21, at 825 (indicating that the leverage gained through ex parte
attachment procedures serves a reasonable function by inducing defaulting debtors to settle, thus reducing the burden on courts).
25
See Amicus Brief, supra note 22, at 14.
26 North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); Sniadach v.
Family Fin. Corp. of Bay View, 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
27 See, e.g., John P. Clarkson, Creditors' Prejudgment Remedies and Due Process of LawConnecticut's Summary Procedure Summarily Upheld: Fermont Division, Dynamics Corp. of
America v. Smith, 12 CoN. L Riw. 174 passim (1979) (reviewing the Sniadach tetrad as the
dominant background for constitutional due process as applied to prejudgment
remedies).
28 See supra note 20.
29 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
30 Wis. STAT. § 267.18(2)(a), quoted in Sniadach, 395 U.S. at 338 n.1.
31
Sniadach, 395 U.S. at 337.
23
24
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cess for attachments in general,"3 2 the Court recognized the "tremendous hardship" that resulted in "grave injustice" because of the
creditor's ability to gain leverage to collect the alleged debt.3 3
Although the deprivation involved only the loss of the use of the garnished wages during adjudication of the underlying claim,3 4 the significant impact of the taking convinced the Court that predeprivation
process was required.3 5
Supporting a traditional approach to due process in his dissenting opinion, Justice Black argned that the historical roots of garnishment provided adequate pedigree for its continued constitutional
validity.36 He contended that because -temporary deprivations had
been acceptable process historically, such, losses should not be pro37
tected by the Due Process Clause today.
Douglas' majority opinion and Black's dissent shaped the debate
that continues today: what kind of property interests does the Due
Process Clause encompass, and what role do traditionally acceptable
32

Id. at 340. For the notion of "attachments in general,"Justice Douglas cites McKay

v. McInnes, 279 U.S. 820 (1929) (upholding a Maine attachment law where the attachment
was considered a basic mechanism of debtor-creditor law resulting in conditional, temporary deprivations not rising to a constitutionally protected interest).
This one sentence illustrates much of the confusion regarding the holding of the entire series of cases. It can easily be interpreted as a statement that attachment cases must
always be adjudicated on the particular facts of the case, rather than through the establishment of broad principles that carry over to generalized fact situations. As such, Sniadach
suggests the validity of a "narrow" reading holding only that garnishment of wages of lowincome individuals is unconstitutional.
33
Sniadach, 395 U.S. at 340, 341. See also Scott, supra note 4, at 816 n.31 ("There is
substantial evidence that wage garnishment is used by creditors less as a collection dervice
[sic) than as a way to exert leverage, prompting the debtor either to refinance the obligation or pay the debt."); C. Kenneth Grosse & Charles W. Lean, Comment, Wage Garnishment in Washington-An EmpiricalStudy, 43 WAsH. L. REv. 743 (1968); James A. Jablonski,
Comment, Wage Garnishment as a Collection Device 1967 Wis. L. REv. 759.
34 Sniadach, 395 U.S. at 342 (Harlan, J., concurring).
35 "Where the taking of one's property is so obvious, it needs no extended argument
to conclude that absent notice and a prior hearing this prejudgment garnishment procedure violates the fundamental principles of due process." Id. (Douglas, J., writing for the
Court) (citations omitted).
The conclusory nature of the discussion of the process due suggests that the categorization of the deprivation as one that came within the terms of the Due Process Clause was
the acute constitutional question for the Court. The Court at one point characterized the
issue by asking "wbether there has been a taking of property without that procedural due
process that is required by the Fourteenth Amendment... [i.e.,) 'the right to be heard.'"
Id. at 339.
36 Id. at 344-351 (Black, J., dissenting).
37
"The ability to place a lien upon a man's property, such as to temporarily deprive
him of its beneficial use, without any judicial determination of probable cause dates back
not only to medieval England but also to Roman times." Id. at 349 (Black, J., dissenting)
(citation omitted). Contrast this with the emphasis on the change in the economic system
in the majority opinion. Id. at 340 ("The fact that a procedure would pass muster under a
feudal regime does not mean it gives necessary protection to all property in its modem
forms.").
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procedures play in determining constitutional validity? Black and
Douglas suggested diametrically opposed theories of the constitutional floor of due process-reliance on pedigreed requirements underlying the Framers' procedural understanding at the time of the
amendments3 s versus an evolving interpretation of fundamental fairness derived "from the specifics of the Constitution ... [and] from
concepts which are part of the Anglo-American legal heritage."3 9
Many early interpreters of Sniadach viewed the case as a narrow
exception to the traditional understanding of the constitutionality of
attachment proceedings. 40 Others interpreted Sniadach to apply
broadly to garnishments of any type.4 1 Still others were uncertain
whether the holding was limited to circumstances involving severe
deprivation:
It was not clear whether the Supreme Court was ruling solely on
constitutional due process grounds or was acknowledging a "hardship" exception to venerable prejudgment remedies. Another area
of confusion was whether the factual context of Sniadachcould be
taken as describing the full extent of the opinion's reach, or
whether the language "specialized type of property" implied a some42
what larger category of affected property rights.

However broad the interpretation, some feared that the case had
"open[ed] a Pandora's box that [would] leave in ruin a very large and
well recognized part of our jurisprudence." 43
The narrow "hardship" interpretation rests on Sniadach's langnage and its relationship to a series of cases in which the Court ex38 Jurists such as Justice Black who support an "original intent" approach tend to decry calls to fairness as little more than a resort to undefined principles of natural law.
Justice Black held little regard for "those canons of decency and fairness which express the
notions ofjustice of English-speaking peoples," a description of due process attributed to
Justice Frankfurther. Id. at 350 (Black, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
39 Id. at 342-43 (Harlan, J., concurring).
40
The following cases are illustrative of courts interpreting Sniadach only to require
extraordinary procedural protection for wages: American Olean Tile Co. v. Zimmerman,
317 F. Supp. 150, 152 (D. Haw. 1970) ("garnishment of wages [is] a limited exception to
the general rule of legality of garnishment statutes"); Roofing Wholesale Co. v. Palmer, 502
P.2d 1327 (Ariz. 1972) (limiting Sniadach to wages); Termplan inc. v. Superior Court, 463
P.2d 68 (Ariz. 1969) (general property attachment); People ex reL Lynch v. Superior Court,
464 P.2d 126 (Cal. 1970) (property attachment).
41 See, e.g., Randone v. Appellate Dep't of the Superior Court, 488 P.2d 13 (Cal. 1971)
(finding the attachment of a bank account included within the principle of Sniadach);
Jones Press, Inc. v. Motor Travel Servs., Inc., 176 N.W.2d 87 (Minn. 1970) (considering
Sniadach based on a broad due process principle requiring prior hearing and notice); Larson v. Fetherston, 172 N.W.2d 20 (Wis. 1969) (finding no distinction between wages and
other property in garnishment proceedings in a case involving prejudgment garnishment
of accounts receivable).
42 Etheredge v. Bradley, 502 P.2d 146, 149 (Alaska 1972).
43 Lawrence J. Fleming, Garnishment and the Supreme Court, 74 COM. L.J. 264, 265
(1969), quoted in Nickles, supra note 4, at 612-13.
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amined the impact of legal process upon those who were most
disadvantaged by the system-the poor and welfare recipients. 4 4 The
Court granted extra protection to indigents without declaring them a
protected suspect class under the Equal Protection Clause. 45 For example, in Douglas v. California,4 6 the Court held that the state must
appoint counsel for an indigent for a first appeal granted of right after a criminal conviction. 47 Harperv. VirginiaBoard of Elections48 invalidated the poll tax requirement for voting as a discriminatory measure
that prevented equal electoral participation by indigents.49 Shapiro v.
Thompson50 invalidated a state statute that denied welfare benefits to
new residents, finding the denial a penalty that infringed upon the
fundamental right to travel. 5 1
After Sniadach, the trend toward protection of indigent rights
continued briefly52 in early welfare entitlement cases such as Goldberg
v. Kelly,53 in which the Court found the stark need of welfare recipients worthy of special protection from summary termination of government benefits. 54 Like Sniadach, Goldberg acknowledged that the
balancing of interests might require adjustment to consider the extent
to which the one deprived would be "condemned to suffer grievous
loss."5 5 In Boddie v. Connecticut,56 the Court also provided protection
44

See generally Frank I. Michelman, On Protectingthe PoorThrough the FourteenthAmend-

ment, 83 HARv.L. REv. 71 (1969) (suggesting that indigency should be considered a suspect
class for the purpose of Equal Protection Clause analysis).
45
See infra note 52.
46
372 U.S. 353 (1963).
47
Id. at 357.
48
383 U.S. 663 (1966).
49 Id. at 666.
50
394 U.S. 618 (1969).
51 Id. at 527-29. The Court rejected the state's argument that a waiting period was
justified to preserve fiscal integrity by discouraging indigents from entering the jurisdiction. Id. at 629.
52 This incipient recognition of special constitutional protection for the poor never
fully materialized. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (upholding a Maryland
statute limiting the award a family could receive under Aid to Families with Dependent
Children). The DandridgeCourt explicitly refrained from applying a different standard in
spite of the situation of dire need: "[t]he administration of public welfare assistance...
involves the most basic economic needs of impoverished human beings ...but we can find
no basis for applying a different constitutional standard." Id. at 485. The move towards
greater protection for indigents ended abruptly in 1972 with the addition ofJustices Rehnquist and Powell to the Court. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1 (1973) (Powell, J.) (refusing to invalidate a public school financing scheme even
though it disadvantaged the poor who resided in districts with low property tax bases and
rejecting the lower court's finding that poverty was a suspect classification).
53 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
54 Id. at 264.
55
Id. at 262-63 (quotingJoint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123,
168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). See also Jeanne C. Ferriot, Garnishment and the
Poor in Louisiana, 33 Loy. L. REv. 79, 103 (1987).
56 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
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to indigents challenging state divorce fee requirements. 5 7 Finally,
Tate v. Short5 8 invalidated a Texas law jailing the poor for inability to
pay fines. 59
Amidst this concern for indigents and the accompanying uncertainty about the breadth of the Sniadach decision, the Court considered a second prejudgment remedy case, Fuentes v. Shevin.60
B.

Fuentes v. Shevin
The Fuentes Court6 1 found Florida's6 2 and Pennsylvania's6 3 re-

57
58

Id. at 374.
401 U.S. 395 (1971).

59 Id. at 397. To some extent, the court continued to consider the extent to which
deprivations may produce grievous loss. See Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436
U.S. 1 (1978) (considering the seriousness of the loss in determining procedural requirements for termination of utilities).
60
407 U.S. 67 (1972).
61 Justice Stewart wrote for "a four-Justice majority of a seven-Justice shorthanded
Court." Di-Chem, 419 U.S. at 617 (Blackmun,J., dissenting). The majority consisted ofJustices Stewart, Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall. Newly appointedJustices Powell and Rehnquist did not participate in the decision because the case had been argued before the
Court prior to their installment. Justice Whitejoined by ChiefJustice Burger and Justice
Blackmun, dissented.
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 78.01-78.13 (Supp. 1972-73), quoted in Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 73-74
62
n.5, provides as follows:
78.01: Right to Replevin.-Any person whose goods or chattels are wrongfully detained by any other person or officer may have a writ of replevin to
recover them ....
78.07: Bond; requisites.-Before a replevy writ issues, plaintiff shall file a
bond with surety payable to defendant to be approved by the clerk in at
least double the value of the property to be replevied conditioned that
plaintiff will prosecute his action to effect and without delay ....
78.08: Writ; form; return.-The writ shall command the officer.., to
replevy the goods and chattels in possession of defendant, describing them,
and to summon the defendant to answer the complaint ....
78.13: Writ; disposition of property levied on.-The officer executing the
writ shall deliver the property to plaintiff after the lapse of three (3) days
from the time the property was taken unless within the three (3) days defendant gives bond.., in double the value of the property ....
Id.
63
PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 12, § 1821, cited in Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 75-76 n.7, authorizes writs
of replevin "in all cases whatsoever, where replevins may be granted by the laws of England." PA. R. Crv. P. 1073, 1076, 1077, quoted in Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 76-77 n.7, set forth
procedural prerequisites for issuance of a prejudgment writ:
Rule 1073. Commencement of Action
(a) An action of replevin with bond shall be commenced by filing with the
prothonotary a praecipe for a writ of replevin with bond, together with (1)
the plaintiff's affidavit of the value of the property to be replevied, and (2)
the plaintiff's bond in double the value of the property ....
Rule 1076. Counterbond
(a) A counterbond may be filed with the prothonotary by a defendant ....
within seventy-two (72) hours after the property has been replevied ....
(b) The counterbond shall be in the same amount as the original bond ....
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plevin statutes unconstitutional. 64 The Florida case involved the
purchase of a stove and stereo on an installment contract under which
the vendor retained title to the goods until payments were completed. 65 The Pennsylvania case involved four different individuals
66
whose property had been replevied.
The Court noted the limited protections provided by the statutes.
Neither required notice or opportunity for hearing before permitting
ex parte seizures. Florida's statute contained no probable cause requirement: a clerk issued the writ on the "bare assertion" of the party
seeking replevin, 67 requiring only that the party post a security bond
and file a complaint for repossession. 6 Debtor safeguards included
1) an opportunity for a hearing on the merits at the trial for repossession and 2) a bonding provision allowing an alleged debtor to recover
the property in return for providing other security.69 The Pennsylvania statute provided even fewer safeguards: it did not require that
the party seeking the writ initiate a court action on the underlying
claim. As a result, an alleged debtor might never have an opportunity
for a hearing on the merits unless she initiated an independent recovery action.7 0
In Fuentes, the Court applied a two-step due process analysis that
first addressed whether the Due Process Clause protected the type of
Rule 1077. Disposition of Replevied Property. Sheriff's Return
(b) Property taken into possession by the sheriff shall be held by him until
the expiration of the time for filing a counterbond. If the property is not
ordered to be impounded and if no counterbond is filed, the sheriff shall
deliver the property to the plaintiff.
In addition, Rule 1037(a) provides process to require the plaintiff to file a post-seizure
complaint.
64 The Court also addressed an ancillary issue of whether a buyer waives due process
rights by signing a default clause in an installment contract. After discussion of the
problems of contracts of adhesion involving parties of unequal bargaining power, the
Court concluded that the clause on its face did not constitute a waiver. Fuentes,407 U.S. at
95.
65
Id. at 70. The purchaser defaulted on payments after a dispute over servicing, so
the vendor filed for repossession. Id. The repossession procedure required completion of
a form document, clerk issuance of a writ, and sheriff action to seize the chattel. Id. at 71.
Fuentes brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim challenging the constitutionality of Florida's
replevin statute and seeking both declaratory and injunctive relief from the replevin. Id. at
71 n.3.
66 Id. For three defendants, writs were executed on the vendor's claim that they were
falling behind in payments for a bed, table, and other household goods purchased on
installment contracts. Id. The writ for the fourth defendant, Rosa Washington, was issued
to seize her son's clothes, furniture and toys during a custody dispute with her former
husband. Id. at 72.
67
Id. at 74.,
68 Id.
69
Id. at 75.
70
Id. at 75 n.7.
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interest at stake 7 l and then determined the appropriate process by
balancing state and private interests 7 2 The Fuentes Court answered
the threshold question affirmatively even though the replevin was potentially temporary and the debtor had never held full title to the
property because of the installment sales agreement.7 3 Having concluded that the deprivation "[could] not be characterized as de
minimis,"7 4 the Court determined that traditional due process required "some kind of notice and opportunity to be heard"7 5 regard76
less of any possible increased administrative burden.
Variations of the phrase "some kind of prior hearing" echo like a
litany throughout the Fuentesopinion.77 The appropriate timingof notice and hearing thus became central to the constitutional due process
analysis.78 The Court suggested that due process tolerates variances in
71 See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1972). The first prong of the
analysis asks whether the government action constitutes a deprivation of life, liberty, or
property. Brock v. Roadway Express, Inc., 481 U.S. 252, 260 (1987).
72 Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) ("Once it is determined that due
process applies, the question remains what process is due."). The Morrisey Court emphasized the importance of avoiding rigid rules in due process analysis: "due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands." Id.
The key cases in the development of the two-step due process analysis were Perry v.
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1973); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Lynch v.
Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961). See generally Wayne McCormack, Federalism
and Section 1983 Limitationson JudicialEnforcement of ConstitutionalProtections,Part1,60 VA.
L. REv. 1, 64-66 (1974) (discussing the two steps in entitlement due process analysis). For
further discussion of the two-step analysis within the prejudgment remedy context, see
infra notes 288-91 and accompanying text.
73 Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 84-85 (analogizing the'Fuentesdeprivation to the loss suffered
from suspension of a driver's license, which it had found protected under due process in
Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971)).
74 Id. at 90 n.21 (quoting Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp. of Bay View, 395 U.S. 337, 342
(1960) (Harlan,J., concurring)).
75 Id. at 79-80. In deciding what process was due, the Court looked first to the historical underpinnings of replevin. Id. at 78. Early common law actions allowed the replevied
owner to attempt to halt the action by claiming rightful possession. The sheriff was then
empowered to decide the question of ownership. Id. at 79 (citing 3 W.S. HOLDSWORTH,
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 284 (1927)). A creditor seeking state assistance to recover goods
wrongfully detained had to proceed through an action for debt or detinue, which did not
allow seizure of the property before judgment on the underlying claim. Id. "[Wihen the
common law did allow prejudgment seizure by state power, it provided some kind of notice
and opportunity to be heard... and a state official made at least a summary determination of
the relative rights of the disputing parties before.., taking goods from one of them." Id.
at 79-80 (emphasis added).
76 "[O]rdinary hearing costs are no more able to override due process rights in the
creditor-debtor context than in other contexts." Id. at 92 n.29.
77 See, e.g., id. at 70, 77, 82, 84, 86.
78 "The issue is whether procedural due process in the context of these cases requires an
opportunity for a hearing before the State authorizes its agents to seize property." Id. at 80
(first emphasis added). Notice and an opportunity for hearing "must be granted at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." Id. (citation omitted). " 'No better instrument has been devised for arriving at truth than to give a person in jeopardy of serious loss
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the form of a hearing but still requires a hearing before replevin and
79
similar deprivations.
The replevin statutes clearly did not fall within the "extraordinary
circumstances" exception to this "root requirement" for prior notice
and hearing outlined in Fuentes.80 The Court listed three requirements for the exception:
First, in each case, the seizure has been directly necessary to secure
an important governmental or general public interest. Second,
there has been a special need for very prompt action. Third, the
State has kept strict control over its monopoly of legitimate force:
the person initiating the seizure has been a government official responsible for determining, under the standards of a narrowly drawn
statute, that
it was necessary and justified in the particular
81
instance.
The statutes under consideration for prejudgment replevin did not
meet the three-factor test. First, the creditor's private gain was not
comparable to war efforts or protection of the public health. 82 Second, the statutes were not limited to situations demanding prompt
notice of the case against him and opportunity to meet it.' " Id. at 81 (quotingJoint AntiFascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 170-72 (1951) (FrankfurterJ., concurring)). "[T]o serve its full purpose.... it must be granted at a time when the deprivation
can still be prevented." Id.
See also Kay & Lubin, supra note 4, at 716 ("These cases are concerned solely with the
-timing of state takings with respect to notice and hearing, not with the substantive policy
reasons which migbt prompt the state to engage in such takings."); Nickles, supra note 4, at
611 n.16 (the timing of the hearing is the heart of the Fuentes decision).
79 Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 82.
80
Id. at 81. In illustrating the exception, the Court refers to the following cases allowing attachment without prior hearing: Coffin Bros. & Co. v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29 (1928)
(allowing outright seizure to protect the public from the immediate harm of a bank failure); Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921) (allowing attachment necessary to secure
jurisdiction in state court); McKay v. Mclnnes, 279 U.S. 820 (1929) (upholding an attachment statute creating a lien as security for judgment in litigation where a non-resident sues
a resident to collect a debt). Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 91 n.23. The Court also provides the
following "outright seizure" cases as examples of the underlying rationale for the excepdon: Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 597 (1931) ("Delay in the judicial determination of property rights is not uncommon where it is essential that governmental needs be
immediately satisfied." (internal quotations marks omitted)); Central Union Trnst Co. v.
Garvan, 254 U.S. 554, 566 (1921) (upholding immediate seizure of property belonging to
the enemy during wartime); Stoehr v. Wallace, 255 U.S. 239, 245 (1921) (upholding immediate seizure of goods in the hands of the enemy during war); United States v. Pfitsch, 256
U.S. 547, 553 (1921) (upholding requisitioning of goods to meet the needs of-the national
war effort); Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947) (upholding appointment of a conservator to take possession of a financial institution as protection against the economic disaster
of a failure); Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950) (allowing seizure
to protect the public from misbranded drugs that might be misleading); North Am. Cold
Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908) (allowing seizure of warehoused goods to
protect the public from contaminated foods unfit for consumption). Fuentes, 407 U.S. at
92 nn.24-28.
81 Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 91.
82 Id. at 92-93.
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attention, even though some creditors might show immediate danger
of concealment or destructiori of disputed property.8 3 Third, the statutes allowed private parties to use state power to replevy goods without official evaluation of the proceeding, leaving the state to "act[]
84
largely in the dark."
Emphasizing the dual creditor-debtor interests, Justice White set
the stage for the next two cases in his dissenting opinion. Spurred by
interests in federalism8 5 and concerns for the practicalities of prior
hearings when self-help measures are also available,8 6 White stressed
that both parties in the typical installment contract creditor-debtor relationship have property interests: the buyer wants continued use until actual adverse judgment, and the seller wants protection of the
security from further deterioration.8 7 White emphasized that there is
"no automatic test for determining whether and when due process of
law requires adversary proceedings."8 8 Given the duality of interests,
White urged that balancing was necessary to determine required
89
procedures.
C. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co.90
In Mitchell, the Court 91 seemed to overrule Fuentes by upholding a
Louisiana statute 92 that permitted sequestration without prior notice
Id. at 93.
Id.
85
Id. at 102 (White, J., dissenting).
86 Justice White noted that creditors can continue to repossess chattels by putting
more explicit provisions in the contract, by giving notice of a hearing and taking possession on default, or by showing probable cause at a hearing. Id. The additional procedural
requirements, however, would presumably result in increased costs for-and lesser availability of-credit. Id. at 103.
87 Id. at 99-100. Later, White adds "I would not ignore, as the Court does, the creditor's interest in preventing further use and deterioration of the property in which he has
substantial interest... [Tihe creditor has a 'property' interest as deserving of protection
as that of the debtor." Id. at 102.
88
Id. at 101.
89 Id. at 101-02. "[W]hat procedures due process may require under any given set of
circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the government
function involved as well as of the private interest that has been affected by governmental
action." Id. (citation omitted).
83

84

90
91

416 U.S. 600 (1974).

Justice White, the dissenter in Fuentes,wrote the opinion for the majority, joined by
Chief Justice Burger andJustices Powell, Rehnquist, and Blackmun. Justice Stewartjoined
by Justices Douglas and Marshall and byJustice Brennan in part, dissented.
92 LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. arts. 281-83, 2373, 3501, 3571 (West 1961), quoted in
Mitchell, 416 U.S. at 620-23. The Louisiana sequestration procedure involved the filing of a
suit alleging sale, overdue balance, and vendor's lien. Ajudge signed the order for the writ
after the creditor filed an affidavit claiming possible waste and posted a bond for an
amount double the value of the property subject to sequestration. If the debtor requested
a hearing for immediate dissolution, the burden of proof was on the creditor to establish
debt, lien, and delinquency. The debtor could end the sequestration by filing her own
bond. Mitchell, 416 U.S. at 605-07.
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or hearing 93 when an installment seller retained a statutorily created
vendor's lien. 94 Because the vendor faced legitimate concerns that

the buyer would transfer the property95 and eliminate the state-created lien 9 6 in the period pending resolution of the underlying action,
the Court considered procedural protections for the interests of both
97
parties.
Balancing these dual interests,98 the Court found that the statute
provided "a constitutional accommodation of the conflicting interests" that met Due Process Clause requirements. 9 9 The vendor's inter93 Various commentators interpreted Mitchell as retreating from the Fuentes rule. See,
e.g., John C. Anderson & Greg Guidry, Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co.: Recognition of Creditors'
Rights, 80 COM. LJ. 63 (1975); RobertJ. Hobbs, Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co.: The 1974 Revised Edition of ConsumerDueProcess, 8 CLEAINGHOUSE REv. 182 (1974); Nickles, supra note
4, at 616; Albert M. Pearson, Due Process and the Debtor: The Impact ofMitchell v. W.T. Grant,
28 OKLA. L. REv. 743 (1975) (discussing the distinction between the fault-based standard of
Fuentes and the fact-based statutory scheme of Mitchell); The Supreme Court 1973 Term, 88
HRv. L. REv. 41 (1974); Comment, A Coufusing Course Made More Confusing. The Supreme
Court, Due Process, and Summary CreditorRemedies, 70 Nw. U. L. REv. 331 (1975); Note,
ChangingConcepts of ConsumerDueProcess in the Supreme Conrt-TheNew ConservativeMajority
Bids Farewellto Fuentes, 60 lowA L. REv. 262 (1974); Note, Prudgment Creditors'RemediesAnother Recipefor the Due Process Cookbook, 47 U. CoLo. L. REv. 129 (1975) (suggesting that
Mitchell represents a distinctly different approach to prejudgment due process).
94 Mitchell; 416 U.S. at 601. The Louisiana legislature created the vendor's lien in lieu
of the liens arising under the Uniform Commercial Code [hereinafter UCC] because Louisiana is the only state that has not adopted the UCC provisions. "[S]tate law provided... a
vendor's lien to secure the unpaid balance of the purchase price." Id. at 604. Generally, a
vendor's lien is "[a]n equitable security which arises from the fact that a vendee has received from his vendor property for which he has not paid the full consideration, and such
lien exists independently of any express agreement." BLACK'S LAW DITIONARY 1555 (6th
ed. 1990).
95 Mitchell,416 U.S. at 608-09. The Court noted "[t]wo principal concerns[:] ... that,
pending resolution of the dispute, the property would deteriorate or be wasted in the
hands of the possessor and that the latter might sell or otherwise dispose of the goods. A
minor theme was that official intervention would forestall violent self-help and retaliation."
Id. at 605 (citing Robert Wyness Millar, JudicialSequestration in Louisiana:Some Account ofIts
Sources, 30 TuL. L. REv. 201, 206 (1956)).
96 [U]nder Louisiana law, the vendor's lien expires if the buyer transfers possession. It follows that if the vendor is to retain his lien, superior to the
rights of other creditors of the buyer, it is imperative when default occurs
that the property be sequestered in order to foreclose th[at] possibility.
Id. at 609.
97

98

Id. at 604.

[W e remain unconvinced that the impact on the debtor of deprivation of
the household goods here in question overrides his inability to make the
creditor whole for wrongful possession, the risk of destruction or alienation
if notice and a prior hearing are supplied, and the low risk of a wrongful
determination of possession through the procedures now employed.
Id. at 610.
The Mitchell decision preceded the administrative balancing test in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). The balance in Mitchell however, is like the modified Mathews
test outlined in Doehr. See discussion infra part Ill.B. It compares the competing parties'
interests in the object property and considers in the equation statutory safeguards to forestall error. For further discussion of the Mathews test, see the discussion infra part IV.A.3.
99 Mitchell 416 U.S. at 607.
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est in preventing further deterioration or loss merited substantial
weight in the balance, 10 0 whereas the impact on the debtor figured
only minimally.' 0 ' Safeguards minimizing the risk of error included
the requirement that the seller establish probable success based on
allegations-subject to documentary proof-of debt, lien, and delinquency; 0 2judicial oversight of the process; 0 3 provisions for the plaintiff to secure the attachment and for the defendant to dissolve the
10 5
attachment by posting bond; 0 4 the availability of damage awards;
10 6
and an immediate opportunity for a post-seizure hearing.
Given the ostensible Sniadach-Fuentesrule requiring predeprivation process for property interests subject to due process protection
unless the narrow exigency exception applies,' 0 7 the Mitchell Court
drew several distinctions. 0 8 First, the Court read the pre-Sniadach
cases as requiring some sort of hearing before the deprivation of
property is finalized but not necessarily before initial seizure is allowed. 10 9 This refocused Fuentes on considerations of timing. 110 Second, the Court explicitly adopted the narrow interpretation of
Sniadach,11 explaining that it dealt with the special situation of wage
11 2
garuishment in which the creditor had no preexisting interest.
Fuentes, on the other hand, presented a "typical case" involving a creditor's secured interest, 113 but the statutory procedures failed to provide
adequate safeguards for the debtor's interest. They allowed repossession without judicial supervision based on conclusory assertions pre114
mised on a fault standard.
100

Id. at 608-09, 616.
The Court noted that in this case the debtor did not even take advantage of a full
hearing immediately following execution of the writ, one of the safeguards provided under
the law to reduce the risk of wrongful deprivation. Id. at 611, 618.
102
Id. at 609, 618.
103
Id. at 610, 616.
104
Id. at 608.
101

105

Id. at 616.

Id. at 611.
See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
Mitchell 416 U.S. at 611-17.
Id. at 611. The pre-Sniadach cases "merely stand for the proposition that a hearing
must be had before one is finally deprived of his property and do not deal at all with the
need for a pretermination hearing where a full and immediate post-termination hearing is
provided." Id.
110 See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
106
107
108
109

111 See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
112 Mitchel4 416 U.S. at 614. The forbidding consequences of wage garnishment present" 'distinct problems in our economic system'" meriting special procedural protection.
Id. (quoting Sniadach, 395 U.S. at 340).
11
Id. at 614-15.
114

Id. at 617.
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Mitchellseems at the least to posit a broad "alternative safeguards"
exception to the Sniadach-Fuentesprior hearing rule. 115 The Court,
however, failed to specify either the exception's limits or its requirements. Although deciding that in the Mitchell case the safeguards adequately protected the mutual interests of the parties, 116 the Court
acknowledged that the decision did not substantially alter garnishment or summary self-help remedies of secured creditors and landlords nor undermine the validity of the cases invalidating replevin or
similar statutes which did not clearly subject prejudgment deprivai 7
tions to continuous judicial supervision."
Mitchell reflects the Court's internal disagreement about the constitutional standard for the prejudgment remedy."i 8 The majority had
distinguished Mitchell from precedent by drawing attention to specific
statutory safeguards, so commentators (though uncertain of the importance of the creditor's secured interest) interpreted Mitchell as providing a checklist of ordinary process requirements for provisional
20
creditors' remedies.11 9 North Georgia Finishing,Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc.'
casts doubt upon that interpretation.
115 The breadth of the exception is emphasized injustice Powell's concurring opinion.
He concluded that Fuenteswas essentially overruled. Id. at 623 (Powell,J., concurring). He
implies that the Fuentespresumption of prior notice and hearing applies at most only when
the Mitchell alternative safeguards are missing.
In my view, the constitutional guarantee of procedural due process is fully
satisfied in cases of this kind where state law requires, as a precondition to
invoking the State's aid to sequester property of a defaulting debtor, that
the creditor furnish adequate security and make a specific factual showing
before a neutral officer or magistrate of probable cause to believe that he is
entitled to the relief requested. An opportunity for an adversary hearing
must then be accorded promptly after sequestration to determine the merits of the controversy, with the burden of proof on the creditor.
Id. at 625 (Powell, J., concurring) (emphasis added). See discussion infra part II.A.
116 Id. at 619-20. In his dissent,Justice Stewart objected that the additional safeguards
did not suffice to save the statute. Id. at 629-36 (Stewart, J., joined by Douglas & Marshall,
_U., dissenting). The affidavit still represents a pro forma conclusory allegation, id. at 632;
the ministerial functions of the judge provide no greater protection than when performed
by a clerk, id.; and the vanishing vendor's lien is not substantially different from the creditor's security interest considered in Fuentes, id. at 633.
117 Id. at 620 n.I4.
118 Justice Stewart condemned the Mitchell decision as a politicization of the Court:
A basic change in the law upon a ground no firmer than a change in our
membership invites the popular misconception that this institution is little
different from the two political branches of the Government. No misconception could do more lasting injury to this Court and to the system of law
which it is our abiding mission to serve.
Id. at 636.
119 See, e.g., Kenneth B. Coffey & William H. Benson, Freezing Cash BeforeJudgment: Narrow Remedies and Needed Reform, 57 FLA.BJ. 349 (1983) (suggesting that the five procedural
safeguards outlined in Mitchell are the current procedural due process standard); Prjudgment Attachmen4 supra note 21, at 667 (finding that the Mitchell checklist "rest[s] on a fundamentally different interpretation[ ] of the mandates of due process" than Fuentes).
120 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
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North GeorgiaFinishing,Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc.12 1

In Di-Chem, Di-Chem, Inc. filed suit to recover the purchase price
for goods sold and delivered to North Georgia Finishing, Inc. As permitted under the Georgia garnishment statute,12 2 Di-Chem filed an
affidavit for garnishment of North Georgia Finishing's bank account
12 3
along with its complaint in the underlying action.
At first glance, Di-Chem seems to be a reprise of Sniadach and
Fuentes, ostensibly "relegat[ing] Mitchell to its narrow factual setting." 124 Justice White, who had also authored Mitchell, wrote a
brief' 25 opinion finding the Georgia statute invalid "for the same reasons" as the statutes in Fuentes.126 However, White provided a Mitchell
gloss to the Fuentes rnle, indicating that the seizures in Fuentes were
unconstitutional because they "had been carried out without notice
and without opportunity for a hearing or other safeguard against mis-

121

Id.

GA. CODE ANN. § 46-101 to 103 (1974) (repealed 1976), quoted in Di-Chem, 419 U.S.
at 602-03 n.l.:
§ 46-101 Right to writ; wages exempt until after final judgment ....
§ 46-102 Affidavit; necessity and contents. Bond. The plaintiff... shall
make affidavit before some officer ... or the clerk of any court of record in
which the said garnishment is being filed .... stating the amount claimed
.... and that he has reason to apprehend the loss of the same or some part
thereof unless process of garnishment shall issue, and shall give bond... in
a sum at least equal to double the amount sworn to be due ....
§ 46-103 Affidavit by agent or attorney, When the affidavit shall be made by
the agent or attorney at law of the plaintiff, he may swear according to the
best of his knowledge and belief ....
123
See Di-Chem, 419 U.S. at 601-04.
124
Id. at 609 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment). Powell concurred because the
Georgia statute fell short of the requirements of strict state control outlined in Mitchel
bonding and prompt post-seizure hearing provisions requiring the garnishing party to establish a factual basis of need for the remedy before a "neutral officer." Id. at 611-12.
For commentary suggesting that Di-Chem limited Mitchell to its particular facts and statutory context, see Richard M. Alderman, DefaultJudgmentsand Postjudgment Remedies Meet
the Constitution:Effectuating Sniadach and its Progeny, 65 GEo. L.J. 1, 11 (1976); Comment,
supra note 93, at 346.
125
The majority opinion is only seven pages long. Di-Chem, 419 U.S. at 601-08.
126
Id. at 606. The Court explicitly eschewed the opportunity to look at the particular
factual background of the suit; the fact that both parties were corporations involved in
commercial transactions was irrelevant. Id. at 608. Some commentators had suggested
that Fuentes and Sniadach could best be reconciled with Mitchell as special exceptions protecting low income consumers disadvantaged in the bargaining process. See, e.g., supra
notes 40-43 and accompanying text. Justice Powell's interpretation in Mitchell suggested
that Sniadach and Fuentescreated a "brntal need" exception to normal provisional remedy
procedures. Mitchell 416 U.S. at 625. The Di-Chem Court's refusal to consider the equal
bargaining status of the commercial parties, however, weakened those arguments while
steering the Court clear of substantive due process protection of the contractual bargaining process.
122
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taken repossession."1 27 Georgia's statute likewise provided "none of the
12
saving characteristics" of the statute in Mitchell'
In his concurrence, Justice Powell explicitly interpreted Di-Chem
and Mitchell as establishing specific criteria for exparte attachment: (1)
provision of adequate security, (2) evaluation of the attachment request by a neutral court officer, (3) grounding of the request in adequate facts, (4) establishment of need to prevent removal or
dissipation of the assets to satisfy the underlying claim, (5) provision
for a prompt postgarnishment judicial hearing, (6) requirement of a
probable cause standard at the hearing, and (7) opportunity for the
owner to dissolve garnishment by posting bond. 129 The Georgia statute's conclusory affidavit and lack of hearing, bonding and probable
cause provisions rendered it deficient.' 3 0 Justice Blackmun objected
that "the Court now has embarked on a case-by-case analysis .... That
road . . . provides no satisfactory answers to issues of constitutional
magnitude." 13 Blackmun urged that Sniadach's holding be restricted
133
to wages' 3 2 and that Fuentes be seen as "severely limited by Mitchell'
In any event, Blackmun considered Fuentes, a four to three decision of
34
a "shorthanded Court," of little precedential value.'
The majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions raise important questions regarding the relationship between Di-Chem, Mitchell,
and the earlier cases. If Di-Chem limits the holding in Mitchell to its
facts, it revitalizes the Sniadach-Fuentes presumption of prior notice
and hearing. Alternatively, it could be understood to limit Sniadach
and Fuentes to situations involving serious deprivations by establishing
a catalog of criteria that meet the constitutional test for normal creditor-debtor situations. From yet another perspective, it could be interpreted to limit Sniadach and Fuentes to their factual situations by
requiring ad hoc balancing of competing interests and procedural
safegnards in each case.

127
128
129

Di-Chet, 419 U.S. at 606 (emphasis added).
Id. at 607.

Id. at 611-13 (Powell, J., concurring).
130 "1 consider the combination of these deficiencies to be fatal to the Georgia statute.
Quite simply, the Georgia provisions fail to afford fundamental fairness in their accommodation of the respective interests of creditor and debtor." Id. at 613-14.
131 Id. at 620 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
132 Id. at 615 (noting that Douglas's opinion in Sniadach referred to "a specialized type
of property"). Blackmun later wrote that Sniadach "reeks of wages." Id. at 619.
133 Id. at 616.
134 Id. at 616, 617.
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11
THE SEARCH FOR A RuLE

In a system where constitutional doctrine evolves by analogy, doctrinal parameters are not always clear. When changes in Court personnel result in differing jurisprudential approaches, doctrinal clarity
may be especially limited. The changeover from the Warren Court to
the Burger-Rehnquist Court paralleled the rapid development of the
administrative state and a shift in judicial focus from protection of
individual rights to consideration of traditional procedures and administrative burdens. These changes were reflected in the Sniadach
tetrad's shifting interest analysis. 3 5 Initially, the analysis focused on
concern about the impact of state processes on those individuals least
able to bear severe loss. The analysis thereafter shifted to significant
weighting of the administrative burdens of protective procedures and
13 6
of traditionally supported vested property interests.
In spite of different underlying rationales, 3 7 the "momentum towards a rule" inherent in the analogy mechanism ofjudicial decisionmaking 138 can be seen in the Sniadachtetrad. Each decision redefines
the issue by highlighting a different aspect of the problem. Each precedent is slightly reshaped by the new decision. A synthesis begins to
emerge that pulls the competing strands into a coherent rule of law.
A.

The Checklist Approach

The most categorical approach to a synthesis of the Sniadach tetrad is a "checklist analysis" that interprets Mitchell as establishing a
constitutionally acceptable set of procedural safeguards. 139 If these
135 By "interest analysis," I refer to the equitable balancing approach adopted in one
form or another throughout the series of cases as the basis for evaluating provisional
remedies.
136 See generally Thomas W. Logue, Due Process, Postjudgment Garnishment, and "Brutal
Need" Exemptions, 1982 DuE LJ. 192 (1982) (positing two distinct and contradictory approaches to underlying rationales in the Sniadach tetrad, but suggesting that the resultant
holdings are consistent); Scott, supra note 4, at 831, 829 (suggesting a shift from the recognition of a need for substantive regulation of the bargaining process to prevent "constitutional unconscionability" to a focus on "providing an efficient mechanism for resolving
disputes between private parties.").
137
I stress the difference in rationales because of the siguificance ascribed to due process as a constitutional value. See PrjudgmentAttachmen; supra note 21, at 667 (finding that
Mitchell and Fuentes"reston fundamentally different interpretations of the mandates of due
process").
138 See Kay & Lubin, supra note 4, at 726 ("[T]he momentum towards a rule which
reconciles the demands of the present with the decisions of the past is always present.").
See also Logue, supra note 136.
139 See supra notes 102-06 and accompanying text. See also Philip Shuchman, Prejudgment Attachments in Three Courts of Two States, 27 BuFF. L. REV. 459, 462 n.10 (1978):
"While the Court has referred to this set of criteria to invalidate other statutes. ....
it has neither stated that all five characteristics are necessary to
satisfy the Constitution, nor has it suggested which, if any, characteristics
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safeguards are statutorily required, private parties may invoke state
assistance in attachment proceedings without prior notice and hearing. 140 According to this view, Fuentes and Sniadach are limited to
their respective fact situations. "Extraordinary circumstances" would
presumably also provide a narrow exception for public emergencies. 141 Although ostensibly revitalizing Fuentes by relying on it as precedent for the Di-Chem decision, Justice White's additional gloss to the
Fuentes rule14 2 -invalidating seizures "without notice and without opportunity for a hearing or other safeguard against mistaken repossession"14 3 -supports this analysis. White suggested, in effect, that the
Fuentes statute was invalidated because it failed to provide the Mitchell
safeguards.
The difficulty with the "checklist analysis" is the lack of specificity
in Mitchell itself. Although the majority and the concurring opinions
both mention additional safeguards, the concurrence much more
clearly asserts their importance. 4 4 Powell presented an even more
explicit listing of the safeguards in his concurring opinion in DiChem.14 As discussed earlier, the Mitchell majority also emphasized
the importance of the secured creditor interest and its special vulnerability due to its extinction upon transfer. 14 6 Some commentators suggest that the Mitchell safeguards are insufficient without a preexisting
creditor interest. Barry Zaretsky, for example, argues that there is a
'Justice loss" in allowing some unscrupulous creditors to invoke the
state's authority to generate leverage over debtors. 147 Therefore, to
minimize such injustices, safeguards should favor the debtor in those
148
cases where the creditor does not have a written security interest.

are not necessary. In the absence of clear guidelines, most state and lower
federal courts have used all five criteria in assessing a statute's
constitutionality."
140
See, e.g., Coffey & Benson, supra note 119;John E. Gregorich, The Constitutionalityof
Real EstateAttachments, 37 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 701, 703-04 & n.16 (1980).
141
A public emergency would clearly qualify as an "extraordinary circumstance" under
the three-prong Sniadach-Fuentestest. See supra note 80 and accompanying text; infra note
150 and accompanying text.
142
Sce Comment, Justice White's Chemistry: The Mitchelization ofFuentes, 50 WAsH. L. REv.
901 (1975).
143 Di-Chem, 419 U.S. 601, 606 (1975) (emphasis added).

Compare Mitchell, 416 U.S. at 605-10 with id. at 625.
See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
146
See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
147 Zaretsky, supra note 21, at 837.
148 Id. at 831. See also Laurence Levine, Due Process of Law in Pre-JudgmentAttachment
and the Filingof Mechanics' Liens, 50 CoNN. BJ. 335, 345 (1976) (suggesting that a crucial
factor in Mitchellwas the creditor's pre-existing interest); Rendleman, supra note 4, at 555
(suggesting that the Mitchell "dual interest analysis" should apply only to situations in which
the creditor holds a "consensual written security interest").
144
145
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The Extraordinary Circumstances Exception

Other commentators have reconciled Mitchell with Fuentes
through the Sniadach-Fuentes "extraordinary circumstances" exception. 149 Although the three-factor test for the exception seemed narrowly limited to public emergencies, 150 Justice Douglas proffered
special creditor interests, in the context of narrowly drawn statutes, as
a potential exceptional situation. 15 1 Accordingly, these commentators
suggest that safeguarded creditor interests may also be considered
part of this "extraordinary" exception. 152 Predeprivation process is required only when the safeguards are missing.
Richard Kay and Harold Lubin have developed the "extraordinary circumstances" analysis in detail. 5 3 They argue that the three
criteria operate independently; any one is sufficient to generate a con54
stitutional exception to the prior notice and hearing requirement.
The first two criteria-necessity to an important public interest and
urgency of action-are substantive requirements that justify governmental actions to address national emergencies. 155 These include
meeting wartime needs, 56 preventing distribution of dangerous products in the national food supply, 15 7 and undergirding the financial
system.15 8 The third criterion, a procedural requirement of strict governmental control of the seizure, is the "most important" of the three
in establishing the limits of procedural due process.' 59 Kay and Lubin
149
See, e.g., Clarkson, supra note 27; Kay & Lubin, supra note 4; Newton & Timmons,
supra note 4.
150
See supra note 80 and accompanying text. The attachment jurisdiction cases fit
uneasily within the exception. At the time the cases were decided, however, plaintiffs
could not reach nonresident defendants in many circumstances. Today, such defendants
can be legitimately brought under a court's jurisdiction by long-arm statutes. See discussion
infra part IV.B.
151
Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp. of Bay View, 395 U.S. 337, 339 (1969) ("[S]ummary
procedure may well meet the requirements of due process in extraordinary situations. But
in the present case no situation requiring special protection to a state or creditorinterest is
presented by the facts; nor is the Wisconsin statute narrowly drawn to meet any such unusual condition.") (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
152
See, e.g., Kay & Lubin, supra note 4, at 708-22. Even in this context, Mitchell is a
special case because of the statutorily created vendor's lien that is extinguished by the
debtor's transfer of the property. This special status under Louisiana's non-UCO statutory
scheme, it is suggested, allows Mitchell to be categorized within the 'extraordinary circumstances' exception of Fuentes-a situation involving a compelling creditor interest, requiring urgency, and protected by strict state control of process. Id.
153
Id.
154
Id. at 709 & n.23.
155
Id. at 710.
156
Central Union Trust Go. v. Garvin, 254 U.S. 554 (1921), cited in Fuentes, 407 U.S. at

92.
157
North Am. Gold Storage Go. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908), cited in Fuentes, 407
U.S. at 92.
158
Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947), cited in Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 92.
159
Kay & Lubin, supra note 4, at 711.
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suggest that the "ordinary" creditor concerns are not sufficiently urgent to invoke the state's potentially abusive process; most creditors
have some such concerns regarding the harms from depreciation, destruction, or transfer that may occur through delays in repossession. 160 The state must, therefore, either provide prior notice and
hearing or establish additional procedures which are "exceptionally
protective of the interests of the party against whom the seizure is directed."1 61 These exceptional protections bring the creditor interests
1 62
within the "extraordinary circumstances" exception.
The "extraordinary circumstances" analysis, however, allows the
exception to swallow the rule. Ordinary creditor interests seem to be
magically transformed into extraordinary circumstances that circumvent the normal procedural safeguards of prior hearing and notice.
Although some commentators would require that the creditor demonstrate urgent need for the summary procedure,1 63 Mitchell merely suggests that a creditor have a preexisting interest and face the possibility
of loss through transfer. 164 In the "extraordinary circumstances" analysis, the fact that the requisite procedural safeguards are replaced by
substitute safeguards becomes the justification for the replacement
itself.165
C.

The Disjunct Rules Approach

Steve Nickles offers a third approach to synthesis, positing a
number of disjunct rules that, added together, cover the "due process
spectrum." 166 Nickles suggests a basic Fuentes prior notice and hearing
rule with numerous exceptions. 167 The Mitchell "other procedural
safeguards" standard is the major exception; it applies to normal
seizure situations.1 68 There are, however, several exceptions to the
160
161
162
163

Id. at 712.

Id. at 713.
Id.
For example, Barkley Clark and Jonathan Landers find that creditor interests may
come within the exception if a showing of need is required. See Barkley Clark &Jonathan
M. Landers, Sniadach, Fuentes and Beyond: The CreditorMeets the Constitution, 59 VA. L. REv.
355, at 369-70 (1973). They argue that delaying the debtor's opportunity for a hearing
requires a showing of imminent possibility of loss of the property at stake. If the creditor
can also show that there are no other assets to satisfy the potentialjudgment and that there
is substantial probability that he will prevail on the merits on the underlying claim, then ex
parte seizure should be allowed. Id.
164
See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
165
"Although the predeprivation 'extraordinary situation' exception has been noted
by courts there has been no meaningful discussion of what the term means. It appears to
be a conclusion rather than the starting point of the analysis." Cristiano v. Courts of the
Justices of the Peace, 669 F. Supp. 662, 669 (D. Del. 1987).
166
See Clarkson, supra note 27; Nickles, supra note 4, at 636. See also Rendleman, supra
note 4.
167
Nickles, supra note 4, passim.
168
Id. at 624, 636.
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"other procedural safeguards" exception. A "brutal need" standard
applies when the particular circumstances of the debtor demand
greater protection-in such cases, prior notice and hearing are required. 169 Similarly, a "minimal risks" exception applies if the minimal risks to the creditor's interests' 70 demonstrate that the creditor is
not entitled to the additional protection that seizure affords-again,
prior notice and hearing are required. 17 1 Finally, the Sniadach-Fuentes
"extraordinary situation" standard allows summary seizures necessi17 2
tated by compelling government interests.
This synthesis produces categories of ordinary, unusual, and extraordinary situations, each with its correlated procedural requirements. Although the set of rules and exceptions provides a
comprehensive doctrinal approach because it encompasses the decided cases, it fails to capture any underlying generalization explaining the exceptions. Its predictive value as a rule of law is, therefore,
limited to those cases that are obvious analogies.
D.

The Neutral Magistrate Rule

The search for an underlying due process rationale has focused
on the various balancing approaches in the tetrad. John Clarkson criticized the "atomistic" approach that compares the facts of the case to a
"checklist of specific provisions," suggesting instead a "holistic" approach that applies an "ad hoc balancing test."1 73
169

Id. at 624-25.

170

Minimal risks to the creditor's interests include situations in which the creditor

lacks a preexisting interest in the property or has failed to show probable waste by the
current possessor. Id. at 623-36.

171 Id. Doug Rendleman would limit application of the Mitchell standard to those cases
involving a "dual interest" established by written contracts. See Rendleman, supra note 4, at
555.
172 Nickles, supra note 4, at 631-36. Nickles explicitly rejects the inclusion of creditor
interests with Mitchell safeguards under this exception. He calls attention to the minimal
protection offered the owner in Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663
(1974) in which the Court upheld a Puerto Rican civil forfeiture statute based on the
Fuentes three-factor exception. There the owner was not aware that his yacht had been
seized for use in illegal drug activities until long afterwards when he sought to revoke the
lease for nonpayment. "The conclusion must be that if 'extraordinary situations' exist
which require procedural safeguards less substantial than those demanded by Mitchell they
involve state intervention in other than private disputes." Id. at 636.
173
See Clarkson, supra note 27, at 187-88. Examples of courts adopting the "atomistic"
approach include Jonnet v. Dollar Sav. Bank, 530 F.2d 1123 (3d Cir. 1976) (striking Pennsylvania's foreign attachment statute for inadequate safeguards) and Guzman v. Western
State Bank, 516 F.2d 125 (8th Cir. 1975) (invalidating a seizure of a mobile home without
adequate safeguards). Examples of courts adopting the "holistic" approach include Hutchison v. Bank of N.C., 392 F. Supp. 888 (M.D.N.C. 1975) (upholding prejudgment attachment of real estate even though no judge was involved in the proceeding) and Stoller
Fisheries, Inc. v. American Title Ins. Co., 258 N.W.2d 336 (Iowa 1977) (upholding an attachment process involving a clerk rather than a judge).
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James McLaughlin counters, however, that ad hoc balancing by
individual courts tends to result in deference to the legislature; the
result of balancing should instead be the development of a generally
applicable constitutional rule. 174 McLaughlin proposes a "neutral
magistrate rule" similar to the principle from Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 175 Although both Mitchell and Di-Chem emphasized various specific requirements such as factual allegations and a bonding
provision, the Mitchell Court referred generally to a process under "judicial control... from beginning to end." 7 6 The central idea of the
neutral magistrate process is that an unbiased judicial officer should
decide whether summary seizure is appropriate based on a probable
cause standard. 17 7 Following this principle, summary seizure statutes
that require participation by a neutral judicial officer who has discretion to deny the writ would meet the procedural due process test. 178
Although McLaughlin's emphasis on a neutral factfinder interposed between the defendant and plaintiff brings procedural due process to the forefront, the rule does not fully explicate the role of the
various Mitchell safeguards. Magistrate process alone may not be a
sufficient safeguard if the statute allows the magistrate to render decisions based on conclusory affidavits. In addition, the lack of a statutory bonding requirement may place the debtor in too vulnerable a
position in spite of a probable cause assessment. Without clarification
of the relative significance of accompanying safeguards, a neutral
magistrate rule alone will not answer the questions left by Mitchell and
Di-Chem.
Thus, the Sniadach tetrad leaves the procedural due process question incompletely answered. Each of the approaches outlined above
represents a plausible approximation of the constitutional rule, but
only the "neutral magistrate rule" seeks a unifying principle. In some
ways, the sum of the commentary carries the analysis back to its beginnings: prejudgment seizures are constitutional only if they are carried
out with adequate safeguards to prevent constitutionally unacceptable
error and to provide acceptable remedies when errors do occur.179

174 James A. McLaughlin, Essay-PrudgmentAttachments and the Concept of the Neutral
Magistrate: A Tale of Two Cases, 83 W. VA. L. REv. 203, 216-17 (1981).
175 Id. at 210, 216-17.
176 Mitchel4 416 U.S. at 616.
177 McLauglin, supra note 174, at 210.
178 Id. See alsoJohnson v. American Credit Co., 581 F.2d 526 (5th Cir. 1978) (finding
that Mitchell does not require ad hoc balancing but that a neutral magistrate with discretion to deny the writ of attachment is an essential constitutional safeguard).
179 See Logue, supra note 136, at 199 (offering such a rule as the consistent holding
across the Sniadach tetrad).
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III
COAWECTICUT

V DOE-ZR

These interwoven procedural issues come together again in Connecticut v. Doehr.180 Preexisting creditor interests, the sufficiency of additional safeguards, exigent circumstances, and interest balancing all
figure in the 1991 decision. The first addition to the Sniadach line of
cases since Di-Chem, Doehrprovides another window to the Court's procedural due process analysis.
A. Facts and Procedural Posture
The Doehr Court addressed the constitutionality of Connecticut's
prejudgment attachment remedy. 18 1 DiGiovanni, the plaintiff, filed
180

501 U.S. 1, 9-11 (1991).
CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 52-278e (1991), cited in Doehr,501 U.S. at 5-6 n.1, outlines the
applicable procedure for prejudgment attachment:
Allowance of prejudgment remedy without hearing. Notice to defendant.
Subsequent hearing and order. Attachment of real property of municipal
officers.
(a) The court... may allow the prejudgment remedy to be issued by an
attorney without hearing ... upon verification by oath of the plaintiff or of
some competent affiant, that there is probable cause to sustain the validity
of the plaintiff's claim and (1) that the prejudgment remedy requested is
for an attachment of real property, or (2) that there is reasonable likelihood that the defendant (A) neither resides in nor maintains an office or
place of business in this state and is not otherwise subject to jurisdiction
over his person by the court, or (B) has hidden or will hide himself so that
process cannot be served on him or (C) is about to remove himself or his
property from this state or (D) is about to fraudulently dispose of or has
fraudulently disposed of any of his property with intent to hinder, delay or
defraud his creditors or (E) has fraudulently hidden or withheld money,
property or effects which should be liable to the satisfaction of his debts or
(F) has stated he is insolvent or has stated he is unable to pay his debts as
they mature.
(b) If a prejudgment remedy is granted pursuant to this section, the plaintiff shall include in the process served on the defendant the following notice prepared by the plaintiff- YOU HAVE RIGHTS SPECIFIED IN THE
CONNECTICUT GENERAL STATUTES, INCLUDING CHAPTER 903a,
WHICH YOU MAY WISH TO EXERCISE CONCERNING THIS PREJUDGMENT REMEDY. THESE. RIGHTS INCLUDE: (1) THE RIGHT TO A
HEARING TO OBJECT TO THE PREJUDGMENT REMEDY FOR LACK
OF PROBABLE CAUSE TO SUSTAIN THE CLAIM; (2) THE RIGHT TO A
HEARING TO REQUEST THAT THE PREJUDGMENT REMEDY BE
MODIFIED, VACATED OR DISMISSED OR THAT A BOND BE SUBSTITUTED; AND (3) THE RIGHT TO A HEARING AS TO ANY PORTION
OF THE PROPERTY ATTACHED WHICH YOU CLAIM IS EXEMPT
FROM EXECUTION.
(c) The defendant appearing in such action may move to dissolve or modify the prejudgment remedy granted pursuant to this section in which event
the court shall proceed to hear and determine such motion expeditiously.
If the court determines at such hearing requested by the defendant that
there is probable cause to sustain the validity of the plaintiff's claim, then
the prejudgment remedy granted shall remain in effect. If the court determines there is no probable cause, the prejudgment remedy shall be dis181
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for a $75,000 attachment on Doehr's home 8 2 as security for a tort suit
alleging assault and battery against Doehr.'8 3 Connecticut allowed attachment of real property'8 4 without notice or prior hearing or
bond' 8 5 "upon verification by oath of the plaintiff... that there is
probable cause to sustain the validity of the plaintiff's claim."' 8 6
Based on the allegations in the required affidavit,' 8 7 the state court
judge found probable cause and ordered attachment. 18 8 Doehr received neither service of the complaint in the underlying action nor
notice of attachment until after the sheriff attached the property. 8 9
Doehr challenged the Connecticut statute in federal court under
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 190 Although
the district court found the statute constitutional, 19 1 the Second Circuit reversed.' 92 Concluding that the applicable rule from the Sniadach tetrad is "that a prior hearing may be postponed where
exceptional circumstances justify such a delay, and where sufficient additional safeguards are present,"193 the Second Circuit found the risk
of wrongful attachment too great.194 The fault-based nature of a tort
claim and the lack of a plaintiff security bond requirement left the
195
defendant unprotected.

solved. An order shall be issued by the court setting forth the action it has
taken.
182 Doehr, 501 U.S. at 5. The Court noted that DiGiovanni had no preexisting interest
in the home. Id.
183

Id.

CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-278e(a) (1) (1991).
Doehr, 501 U.S. at 6.
186
CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 52-278e(a) (1991).
187 The affidavit consisted of five one-sentence statements alleging as follows:
[T] hat the facts set forth in [the plaintiff's] previously submitted complaint
were true; that "I was willfully, wantonly and maliciously assaulted by the
defendant, Brian K. Doehr"; that "[s]aid assault and battery broke my left
wrist and further caused an ecchymosis to my right eye, as well as other
injuries"; and that "I have further expended sums of money for medical
care and treatment." The affidavit concluded with the statement "In my
opinion, the foregoing facts are sufficient to show that there is probable
cause that judgment will be rendered for the plaintiff."
Doehr,501 U.S. at 6-7 (citations omitted).
188
Id. at 7.
189 Id. The attachment notice included information about Doehr's right to a hearing
in which he could challenge probable cause, claim an exemption, or vacate or modify the
attachment. Id.
19o Id.
191 Pinsky v. Duncan, 716 F. Supp. 58 (D. Conn. 1989).
192 Pinsky v. Duncan, 898 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1990).
184

185

193
194

Id. at 855.
Id. at 856.

195

Doehr,501 U.S. at 8-9.
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The Notice and Hearing Requirement

The Supreme Court characterized the issue as determining "what
process must be afforded by a state statute enabling an individual to
enlist the aid of the State to deprive another of his or her property by
means of the prejudgment attachment or similar procedure. 1 9 6 Reviewing the Sniadach tetrad, the Court distinguished Mitchell from
Fuentes and Sniadach based on Mitchells "factual and legal background.1 97 The Court specified the important features of the Mitchell
statute which spared it from invalidation:
[P]rovision of an immediate postdeprivation hearing along with the

option of damages; the requirement that ajudge rather than a clerk
determine that there is a clear showing of entitlement to the writ;
the necessity for a detailed affidavit; and an emphasis on the lienholder's interest in preventing waste or alienation of the encum-

bered property.198
The Court then described the Di-Chem decision as an invalidation
based both on failure to provide notice and prior hearing and on failure to provide additional safeguards. 19 9
The Court's method of determining the validity of the Connecticut statute is significant.2 0 0 Reiterating the Cafeteria Workers2° 1 caveat
that "[d]ue process, unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances,"
the Court applied a balancing test adapted from its entitlement
cases.2 0 2 It offered little explanation other than a noted similarity of
inquiry.2 03 The Mathews20 4 three-pronged test, developed in the context of agency terminations of statutorily created entitlements, considers the following factors:
196
197

198

Id. at 9.
d at 9-10.
d. at 10.

Id.
200 Although the Court was unanimous in holding the statute invalid, Justice Scalia did
notjoin the section of the opinion reviewing the Sniadachtetrad and developing the modified Mathews test. Id. at 4. Scalia wrote separately, basing his support for the application of
the modified Mathews test on the historical lack of recognition of such attachment procedures. Id. at 30 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). This is
consistent with Justice Scalia's opinion in Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990)
(finding that transient jurisdiction enjoys constitutional validity due to its "pedigree" as the
paradigm of the traditional concept of territorial jurisdiction). See also note 361 infra.
201 Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961).
202 Doehr,501 U.S. at 10 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976) and
Cafeteria Workers, 367 U.S. at 895).
203 Id. The Court commented that the Mathews test had "dr[awn] upon [the] prejudgment remedy decisions to determine what process is due when the government itself seeks
to effect a deprivation on its own initiative." I.
204 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
199
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First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal
and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute proce205
dural requirement would entail.
Although prejudgment remedy statutes meet the state action requirement for Due Process Clause analysis, they are essentially remedies for private party disputes that only minimally involve the
government. 20 6 As a result, the burden from additional procedural
safeguards falls mainly on the party seeking attachment rather than
on the government. 20 7 Given the emphasis on the dual private interests of creditor and debtor, the Court modified the Mathews test for
the provisional remedy context:
[The test balances:] first, consideration of the private interest that
will be affected by the prejudgment measure; second, an examination of the risk of erroneous deprivation through the procedures
under attack and the probable value of additional or alternative
safeguards; and third, in contrast to Mathews, principal attention to
the interest of the party seeking the prejudgment remedy, with,
nonetheless, due regard for any ancillary interest the government
may have in providing the procedure or forgoing the added burden
20 8
of providing greater protections.
In applying the modified Mathews-Doehrtest, the Court collapsed
the first prong of the due process two-step analysis 20 9 into the first
prong of the balancing test, discussing whether the interests involved
are even entitled to constitutional protection. 2 10 The Court accepted

207

Id. at 335.
Doehr, 501 U.S. at 10-11.
Id. at 11.

208

Id.

205

206

See supra notes 71-72; infra notes 210, 287-90 and accompanying text.
210 Doehr, 501 U.S. at 10-11. According to Judge Frank Easterbrook, the due process
two-step analysis in the entitlement area of administrative law decisions relies on a substance-process dichotomy: the courts specify process once the legislature has specified substance by creating a property interest statutorily. Frank H. Easterbrook, Substance and Due
Process, 1982 Sup. CT. REv. 85.
209

[Entitlement] due process analysis is a two-step routine. First the Court determines whether by statute or regulation the State has created an entitlement ("liberty or property") the existence or extent of which turns on some
determinable facts. It also is enough that there is an antecedent interest in
personal liberty, one the government may not extinguish except for
cause.... Many cases stop here with a finding that the claim involves
neither liberty nor property....
... No entitlement, no process.... If, however, the constitution, statute, or regulation creates a liberty or property interest, then the second
step-determining "what process is due"-comes into play.
Id. at 87-88.

19941

NOTE-PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS

1631

the Second Circuit's finding that the attachee had significant property
interests, finding that "[the proceeding] clouds title; impairs the ability to sell or otherwise alienate the property; taints any credit rating;
reduces the chance of obtaining a home equity loan or additional
mortgage; and can even place an existing mortgage in technical default where there is an insecurity clause." 2 11 Note that the attachee
suffers neither permanent nor complete physical deprivation of real
property. The attachment may be less injurious than a temporary
deprivation of necessary household goods and wages. 212 Yet the Court
stated summarily that "even the temporary or partial impairments to
property rights that attachments, liens, and similar encumbrances en213
tail are sufficient to merit due process protection."
In assessing the risk of erroneous deprivation, the Court considered the ultimate goal of securing an award to the plaintiff that the
defendant might not otherwise satisfy. 214 In effect, the Court evaluated the statutory considerations of the plaintiff's likelihood of success on the merits to ascertain the increased risks of error in the
absence of additional safeguards. Although the statute required probable cause, 2 15 the Court noted an unresolved ambiguity suggesting a
lesser standard. 216 Aggravating the risk of error were the "one-sided,
self-serving, and conclusory submissions" in both the affidavit and
complaint that provided no basis for judicial review. 2 17 These limitations are particularly likely to lead to mistaken deprivation when the
2 18
underlying claim is a tort action not subject to documentary proof.
211

Doehr,501 U.S. at 11.
Id,at 12.
213 Id. The Court thus expanded due process protection to temporary encumbrances
of real estate formerly considered de minimis deprivations not entitled to constitutional
protection. See generallyJanice Gregg Levy, Lis Pendens and ProceduralDue Process: A Closer
Look After Connecticut v. Doehr, 51 MD.L. REV. 1054 (1992) (finding that Doehr's holding
requires due process protection for lis
pendens actions). The Court distinguished Doehr
from Spielman-Fond, Inc. v. Hanson's, Inc., 417 U.S. 901 (1974), in which the Court summarily affirmed a finding that a mechanic's lien was not a siguificant taking of a property
interest sufficient to entail additional procedural protection under the Due Process Clause.
The DoehrCourt noted that a summary affirmance carries limited precedential value. In
addition, Spielman can be distinguished because the mechanic's lien relies on a preexisting
creditor interest in the property. Doehr,501 U.S. at 12 n.4.
214
Doehr,501 U.S. at 12.
215 See supra note 181.
216 The Court discussed three possible interpretations: (1) "the objective likelihood of
the [underlying] suit's success," (2) "a subjective good faith belief that the suit will succeed," or (3) "a claim with sufficient facts to survive a motion to dismiss." Doehr,501 U.S. at
13 (citations omitted).
217 Id. at 14.
218 Permitting a court to authorize attachment merely because the plaintiff believes the defendant is liable, or because the plaintiff can make out a facially
valid complaint, would permit the deprivation of the defendant's property
when the claim would fail to convince ajury, when it rested on factual allegations that were sufficient to state a cause of action but which the defen212
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The Court found few safeguards to alleviate this risk. The statute
did provide for postattachment notice and hearing and for a double
2 19
damages action for commencement of suit without probable cause.
Three key Mitchell factors, however, were missing: (1) a plaintiff's preexisting interest in the property, (2) an underlying claim subject to
220
documentary proof, and (3) bonding provisions.
Finally, the Court considered the plaintiff's interests de
minimis-nothing more than the plaintiff's desire to ensure availabil22 1
ity of sufficient assets to meet the potential tort judgment award.
There was no preexisting interest in the property,22 2 and the plaintiff
had not alleged actions that would render the property unavailable to
satisfy the judgment.228 The Court found no additional state interest,
specifically stating that the difference between pre- and post-deprivation hearings could mean little in terms of administrative or financial
224
burdens.
The Court noted that historical practice and national trends pro225
vide additional support for invalidating the Connecticut statute.
Tracing the origins of modem attachment to proceedings in the
mayor's and sheriff's courts in London, the Court noted that plaintiffs
were entitled to attach goods only when defendants' actions
threatened the satisfaction of potential awards. 226 The tort claim in
Doehr is thus less closely related to the origins of attachment than the
dant would dispute, or in the case of a mere good-faith standard, even
when the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted.
Id. at 13-14.
219 Id. at 14-15. See statutory provisions supra note 181.
220 Doehr,501 U.S. at 15. The Court's listing of these factors creates ambiguity regarding the holding of the case. It suggests that the Connecticut statute might have been saved
if it had included further safeguards, such as being restricted to preexisting interests rather
than applying in cases where the plaintiff's underlying suit is entirely unrelated to the
property.
221 Id. at 16.
222 The Court gives considerable emphasis to whether the plaintiff has a preexisting
interest in the property. It is a factor both in the evaluation of the plaintiff's interest in the
attachment proceeding and in the assessment of the risk of error. Id.
223 Id. The Court's statement supports the interpretation that Mitchell falls within a
category of private creditor extraordinary circumstances under Fuentes. "Our cases have
recognized such a properly supported claim would be an exigent circumstance permitting
postponing any notice or hearing until after the attachment is effected." Id. (citing Mitchel,
416 U.S. at 609; Fuentes,407 U.S. at 90-92; and Sniadach, 395 U.S. at 339). It is not clear,
however, whether the proper support for such a claim includes both a preexisting creditor
interest and a likelihood of transfer or waste.
224

Id.

225
226

Id.
Id. at 16-17 (citing CHaiu.sD. DRKE, A TREATISE ON THE I Aw OF SurrsBY ATrAcH.

MENTS IN THE UNITED STATES, §§ 40-82 (1866); 1 ROSWELL SHINN, A TREATISE ON THE AMERICAN LAW OF ATrACHMENT AND GARNiSHMENT § 86 (1896)).
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creditor-debtor disputes in the Sniadach tetrad. 2 27 Similarly, most
modem state attachment provisions provide greater protection to the
228
attachee than the disputed Connecticut statute.
C.

The Bond Requirement

Only four of the Justices considered whether due process requires the plaintiff to post bond to ameliorate the potentially severe
consequences of mistaken ex parteprejudgment remedies. 22 9 Even after a hearing, the defendant's interests remain at risk until a final determination on the merits. 230 Connecticut's double damages remedy
for frivolous suits23 ' provides inadequate protection, because it is unavailable until resolution on the merits and easily defended by an attorney opinion supporting the suit.23 2 The Justices concluded,
therefore, that the protection of the bonding provision is necessary.2 33
The additional safeguard, however, is insufficient to dispense with a
23 4
prior hearing.
Doehr, 501 U.S. at 17.
Id. at 17-18. The Court notes that "nearly every State requires either a preattachment hearing, a showing of some exigent circumstance, or both, before permitting an
attachment to take place." Id. at 17.
229 Id. at 18. The Court was, however, unanimous in itsjudgment. See id. at 4. All but
Justice Scalia concurred in the review of the Sniadach tetrad and the rationale for the modified Mathews test. See id. at 30 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice Blackmun, found the discussion of a
bonding requirement and a possible exigent circumstances exception "both unwise and
unnecessary." Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). Justices White, Marshall, Stevens, and
O'Connor found it appropriate to discuss the bonding provision for three reasons:
First, ... the notice and hearing question and the bond question are intertwined and can fairly be considered facets of the same general issue....
Second, this aspect of prejudgment attachment "... [is one] with regard to
which the lower courts are in need of guidance." Third, ... both parties
have briefed and argued the question."
Id. at 18 n.7 (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 435-36 n.23 (1984)) (alterations
in original).
230 I. at 20.
231
CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 52-568(a) (1991) provides that
Any person who commences and prosecutes any civil action or complaint
against another, in his own name, or the name of others, or asserts a defense to any civil action or complaint commenced and prosecuted by another (1) without probable cause, shall pay such other person double
damages, or (2) without probable cause, and with a malicious intent unjustly to vex and trouble such other person, shall pay him treble damages.
232 Doehr,501 U.S. at 20-21.
233 Id. at 23.
234 Id. "[T]he right to be compensated at the end of the case, if the plaintiff loses, for
all provable injuries caused by the attachment is inadequate to redress the harm inflicted,
harm that could have been avoided had an early hearing been held." Id. at 22. The Justices considered the impact on someone who lost an opportunity to sell the property because of the attachment, a parent forced to forego an equity loan which was to have been
used to support his child's education, an entrepreneur unable to find financing to begin a
business because of the attachment blemish on her credit history, or a homeowner faced
with disruptions caused by a technical default. Id.
227
228
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Chief Justice Rehnquist's Concurring Opinion

ChiefJustice Rehnquist supported the judgment based on the circumstances in the application of the Connecticut prejudgment remedy in this case.23 5 His reservation stemmed from recognition of the
Court's decision as "a significant development in the law" 23 6 following
the Sniadach'tetrad. Whereas the tetrad limited the availability of provisional remedies for creditors attempting to secure a defendant's personal property through physical seizure, 23 7 the Doehr Court evaluated
an "incipient lien" impairing full ownership rights to real property
23 8
without actually depriving the defendant of its use.

Rehnquist implied that the extension of procedural due process
protections to encumbrances on real property becomes constitutionally necessary only when the plaintiff does not have a preexisting interest.23 9 He noted that various lower courts have cited the Court's
summary affirmance of a mechanic's lien statute in Spielman-Fond, Inc.
v. Hanson's,Inc. 240 to support the proposition that imposition of a lien

on real property does not constitute a deprivation requiring due process protection. 24 1 The case may alternatively be viewed, he suggested, as protecting the preexisting interest created by statute in
favor of unpaid mechanics. 242 The Court's refusal to review a lis
pendens for want of a substantial federal question in Bartlett v. Williams,243 he claimed, also rested on the preexisting interest. 244 He

thus argued that the Doehr holding only applies to statutes to the exId. at 26 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring).
Id. at 29 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring). Rehnquist compares the Court's holding to
Holmes' "almost casual statement" writing for a unanimous Court in Coffin Bros. & Co. v.
Bennett, 277 U.S. 29, 31 (1928): "[Njothing is more common than to allow parties alleging themselves to be creditors to establish in advance by attachment a lien dependent for
its effect upon the result of the suit." Doehr, 501 U.S. at 29.
237
Id. at 27 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
238 Id.
239 See id at 27-28.
240 417 U.S. 901 (1974).
241 Doehr,501 U.S. at 27.
242 Id. at 28. As the Court had done, Rehnquist merged the two-step analysis in this
discussion by concluding that to require hearings for mechanic's liens would defeat the
liens' purpose:
Since neither the labor nor the material can be reclaimed once it has become a part of the realty, [the mechanic's lien] is the only method by which
workmen or small businessmen who have contributed to the improvement
of the property may be given a remedy.... To require any sort of a contested court hearing or bond before the notice of lien takes effect would
largely defeat the purpose of these statutes.
Id.
243 464 U.S. 801 (1983).
244 Doehr,501 U.S. at 29. The state court had sustained the lien filed in conjunction
with a suit to enjoin defendants from engaging in any transaction to affect title. Williams v.
Bartlett, 457 A.2d 290, 291-92 (Conn. 1983) (finding that a postsequestration hearing provision was sufficient to allow attachment pendente lite even though there was no provision
235
236
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tent that they allow parties to encumber property in which the parties
have no preexisting interest.
IV
FINDING A SYNTHESIS

A cursory reading of the majority opinion in Doehr elicits a rule
superficially similar to the Fuentes rule: prejudgment remedies require
prior notice and hearing absent a showing of "some exigent circumstance."24 5 The difficulty with this rule as a constitutional gnide lies in
the amorphous concept of "some exigent circumstance.124 6 As discussed in Part I, the "extraordinary circumstances" exception in the
Sniadach tetrad originated as a three-factor procedural exception for
legitimate public emergencies. The term as used in Doehr functions
instead as a "catch-all" category for dual interest creditor-debtor attachments that do not require prior notice and hearing. Under another section of the Connecticut statute in question in Doehr, even
attachment for jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant is considered an exigency allowing ex parte proceedings. 247 Without a foundation in fundamental due process values, the term is little more than a
convenient peg on which to hang the cases. It provides no justifying
rationale or principle for the protection required.
The disagreements underlying the decision in Doehr provide little
help. For Rehnquist, the decision depended on a "totality of the circumstances" view of the statute as applied to the particular fact situation of the case. 248 He stressed the lack of a preexisting creditor

interest, at least for the application of due process protections to nonpossessory encumbrances on real property.2 49 For the majority, the
"highly factual," fault-based nature of the underlying claim seemed

for security bonds). The plaintiffs claimed that the defendant had misappropriated the
property from the partnership while occupying a fiduciary position. Id. at 295.
245 See, e.g., Levy, supra note 213, at 1073. This rule is plainly stated in the conclusion

of Section III of the majority opinion in Doehrand again in the introduction to the plurality's discussion of bonding provisions in Section IV. Doehr, 501 U.S. at 18-19.
246 Id.
247 See David J. Baker, Note, The Ex ParteAttachment of Nonresidents' PersonalProperty in
Connecticut: A Statutory Revitalization of Harris v. Balk "Attachment Jurisdiction"'?, 11 U.
BPDcEPORT L. REv. 651, 654-656, 654 n.9 (1991).

248 See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
249 Doehr, 501 U.S. at 27 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). See supra notes 239-44 and
accompanying text. However, Rehnquist disagreed with the "exigent circumstances" requirement discussed by the plurality "We should await concrete cases which present questions involving bonds and exigent circumstances before we attempt to decide when and if
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires them as prerequisites for
lawful attachment." Doehr, 501 U.S. at 30.
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particularly important.2 50 A preexisting creditor interest was just one
2 51
of the possible "countervailing considerations" found lacking.
Others included safeguards such as a bonding provision or an "exigent circumstance," defined here as a threat of imminent loss through
2 52
transfer, encumbrance, or other action by the defendant.
A.

Harmonizing the Quintad
1. Some Lower Court Applications of Doehr

Chief Justice Rehnquist's concurring opinion supports a case by
case adjudication of the constitutionality of attachment statutes as applied to particular fact patterns. 2 53 Apparently, either a preexisting interest held by the attacher orone of the several exigent circumstances
mentioned in the cases, plus some appropriate alternative safeguards
set forth in Mitchell, would meet procedural due process requirements
without need for a prejudgment hearing. On balance-a balance performed by the reviewing court for the particular application of the
statute to the particular plaintiffs and defendants-the weight will
favor either the attachee's interest or the attacher's interest in any
particular situation.
Both the Connecticut Supreme Court in Union Trust Co. v. Heggelund25 4 and the District Court of Connecticut in Shaumyan v.
O'Neil 255 have adopted this approach. The result in these cases grants
the preexisting interest criterion equal importance with the various
criteria establishing the extraordinary circumstances exception, without requiring that the plaintiff demonstrate imminent loss. The Heggelund court found that Doehr was not relevant to the case:
[T] his is not a tort suit, but a suit on a debt, and disputes between
debtors and creditors more readily lend themselves to accurate ex
parte assessments of the merits. Here, as in Mitchell v. W.T. Grant
Co., the risk of error was minimal because the likelihood of recovery
250 Id. at 8, 14-15. The Connecticut statute allowed attachment for any civil action.
Pinsky v. Duncan, 898 F.2d 852, 856 (2d Cir. 1990), afft, 501 U.S. 1 (1991) (citations
omitted).
251 Doehr, 501 U.S. at 14.
252 Id. at 15-16.
253 See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
254 594 A.2d 464 (Conn. 1991).
255 795 F. Supp. 528 (D. Conn. 1992), affl'd, 987 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1993) [hereinafter
Shaumyan Ill.Basing its decision on such a reading, the district court held-and the Sec-

ond Circuit affirmed-that a mechanic's lien does not raise the same due process concerns even though it creates a similar encumbrance on real property. "I he fact specific
application of the Statute to an intentional tort action predicated on a fist fight, rather
than to an action to recover payment for work performed on real property as in Shaumyan I
S.. limited the scope of the Court's analysis in Doehr." Id. at 531.
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involved uncomplicated matters that lent themselves to documen256
tary proof.

In Shaumyan 11, the district court relied heavily on Rehnquist's
concurrence to interpret the applicability of Doehr to a mechanic's
lien. 257 The lien has an effect substantially similar to that of the attachment in Doehr, a cloud on title that impairs marketability and
credit availability. 25 8 The court concluded, however, that the lien
would not fall within Doehr's requirement for a predeprivation hearing. The plaintiff's lack of a preexisting interest was crucial to
Doehr,259 so that the case, the Shaumyan court concluded, "turn[ed]
largely on the high risk implicit in a probable cause determination...
where the underlying claim involves complex and disputed factual allegations."2 60 In Shaumyan 11, however, the mechanic's lien existed
prior to the attachment and rested on a contractual claim. The
Shaumyan II court thus granted a summary judgment motion dismissing the constitutional claim, stressing that its decision upheld "the
261
Statute's constitutionality only as applied to the facts of this case."
Determining constitutionality by this "statute as applied" approach is problematic because it yields inconsistent results and invites
litigation. People are entitled to know the law before they act, but
under this ad hoc balancing approach, parties will not know whether
the procedure is acceptable in their situation until the case is decided
in court. The Sniadach quintad does provide a catalog of factors relevant to the constitutionality of summary attachment proceedings, but
the Supreme Court has not explicitly assessed the value of each factor.
The refusal of a majority of the Justices in Doehr to assess the necessity
for a bonding provision is illustrative. 262 The lower courts may emphasize one or another of the factors according to their reading of the
opinions. Each decision on the constitutionality of the "statute as applied" may, therefore, adjust the weighting or the minimal requirements according to the deciding court's perspective. Both the
outcomes and the underlying rationales may vary from court to court.
The question inevitably arises whether the constitutional protections
can, indeed, be upheld without a clearer understanding of the under263
lying principle.
Heggelund, 594 A.2d at 466 n.3 (quotations and citations omitted).
Shaumyan II, 795 F. Supp at 531, 532-33. The court noted that "the scope of Doehk's
holding is at best unclear." Id. at 532.
258
The District Court had discussed these aspects of the deprivation in its original
opinion. Shaumyan v. O'Neill, 716 F. Supp. 65, 77 (1989).
259 Shaumyan HI,795 F. Supp. at 532.
260
Id. at 531.
261
Id. at 529 (emphasis added).
262
See supra notes 229-34 and accompanying text.
263
See, e.g., supra note 131 and accompanying text.
256
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The Prejudgment Remedy Doctrinal Tree

One way to avoid ad hoc balancing would be to make the exceptions to the predeprivation hearing requirement doctrinally explicit.2 64 The doctrinal framework that emerges from the Sniadach
quintad can be described as follows. Prior to Sniadach (A), there was
an irrebuttable presumption of constitutional validity for attachment
proceedings. Creditors traditionally relied on the state's assistance in
collecting consumer debts, the state could confiscate goods to protect
the public, and plaintiffs could resort to the state's control over property within its jurisdiction to vindicate their rights against a nonresi26 5
dent defendant.
Standing alone, Sniadach (B) focuses on the defendant's "brutal
need." The Court created an exception to the general presumption
266
for garnishment of wages.
(A) Summary proceedings are constitutional
(B)

the defendant shows "brutal need"

The addition of Fuentes (C), however, reverses the presumption:
summary proceedings were unconstitutional unless justified by a com267
pelling public necessity or other "extraordinary circumstance."
(C) Summary proceedings are unconstitutional

~~there

is an '"extraordinar circumstance"

Mitchell (D) shifts the focus back to the state's role in protecting
creditors' interests. The Court allowed summary attachments when
there was a "neutral magistrate" process. The rule created an expansive exception to the presumption covering ordinary creditor-debtor
2 68
proceedings.
264 In effect, this is a refinement of the "disjunct rules" approach discussed in Section
11-C supra based on the additional perspective provided by Doehr.
265
See supra notes 229-34 and accompanying text.
266 See discussion supra part IA.
267 See discussion supra part I.B.
268 See supra notes 90-119, 175-78 and accompanying text. As discussed, the Mitchell
rule clearly creates an exception to the requirement for a prejudgment hearing. It is not
clear whether each of the safeguards explicitly mentioned in Mitchell is necessary to the
exception or whether some subset might be constitutionally sufficient.
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(C) Summary proceedings are unconstitutional
there is an "extraordinary circumstance"
°r<there is "neutral magistrate"
process

or'

(D)

Di-Chem (E) limits the Mitchell rule most clearly by focusing on the
conclusory nature of the allegations.2 69 The ultimate effect of Di-Chem
is the creation of an "insufficient safeguards" exception to the Mitchell
"neutral magistrate" exception to the Sniadach-Fuentes"prior hearing
required" presumption.
(C) Summary proceedings are unconstitutional
(D

Tthere

is an "extraordinary circumstance"
there is "neutral magistrate" process

(E)

there are "insufficient safe uards"

Doehr (F) extends protection to attachments of real property. It
thus brings de minimis restrictions on marketability under the aegis of
the Due Process Clause. 270 The Court also clarified the Di-Chem exception to Mitchell attachment proceedings are constitutionally deficient when based on "highly factual" causes of action even though a
judge issues the writ on a probable cause assessment. 2 71 The dangers
of erroneous deprivation are simply too high. The implication, however, is that the plaintiff's lack of a preexisting interest or exigent circumstance would also render summary procedure unconstitutional,
even with other safeguards. 272 In such cases, the plaintiff's interest

would be insufficient to justify summary proceedings.
269
Although the majority stated that the "statute has none of the saving characteristics" of Mitchell the Court focused on the conclusory nature of the allegation. Di-Chem, 419
U.S. at 607. Powell also emphasized that the "simple and conclusory affidavit" is an inadequate safeguard even when subject to the discretionary review of a "neutral officer." Id at
612 (Powell, J., concurring).
270
See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
271
Doehr, 501 U.S. at 8. See also supra notes 217-18 and accompanying text.
272
In other words, the Court seems to suggest that either a preexisting interest or an
exigent circumstance (as defined) combined with a neutral magistrate process would overcome the Court's concerns regarding the inadequacy of the probable cause standard.
Without those interests weighing on the plaintiff's side, postdeprivation process is
deficient.
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(C) Summary proceedings are unconstitutional
(D) (1there

is an "extraordinary circumstance"

or<

"there is "neutral magistrate" process
(E)

(there
<

are "insufficient safeguards"

plaintiffs interests are insufficient

Although the doctrinal tree removes some of the confusion of the
apparent inconsistencies among the cases, it obscures rather than clarifies the underlying due process values. An alternative approach to
understanding Doehrand the Sniadach tetrad looks instead to the modified Mathews-Doehr balancing test. As noted in Part I, some type of
interest balancing figures in each of the quintad cases. Even before
Doehr, one commentator noted that "[t]he Mathews formulation could
be viewed as a generalization of the concerns indicated in Justice
White's prejudgment seizure opinions, affirming that due process involves a balancing test that can require different procedural safeguards when different interests are at stake."2 73 To understand Doehr,
then, we must look briefly at the history and underlying values of procedural due process.
3.

The Role of Interest Balancingin Due Process Analysis

Due process is the "oldest of our civil rights" 274 yet perhaps-as
the primary protection against the intrusiveness of bureaucratic
power-one of the more controversial ones.27 5 Procedural due process developed in this century with the advent of the administrative
state.2 7 6 Early Court decisions imposed absolute limits on administrative agency powers.2 77 Later, the Court distinguished between rights
protected by common-law causes of action and privileges created by
273

274

Kathleen A. Hillegas, Note, 9 U. Am Lrrri RoCK LJ. 517, 522 (1987).
Edward L. Rubin, Due Process and the AdministrativeState, 72 CAL.L. REv. 1044, 1044

(1984).
275 See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 210, at 109 (suggesting that "the current approach
to due process is unsupportable" because it provides too much power to the courts to

overturn legislative enactments).
276

See id. at 99-109 (arguing that the Due Process Clause, understood as a limited

provision that merely guaranteed certain established legal procedures, was "largely irrelevant" before the advent of the administrative state and the judicial development of entitle-

ment protection).
277

See, e.g., Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287 (1920) (requir-

ing a trial de novo when a company appealed from an agency ratesetting that took its property without due process).
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governmental action, finding the latter exempt from due process
2 78
protection.
The government's denial of benefits to leftists in the 1940s and
'50s led to new due process rationales, 279 such as the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. 2 80 Courts limited agency retaliation by requiring that agency actions come within the scope of legislative
authorization. 281 Perhaps most importantly, the courts developed the
doctrine of invalidating arbitrary action. 28 2 Arbitrariness contradicts
the rule-of-law principle and undermines the fundamental right to
fair process 28 3 central to our "scheme of ordered liberty."28 4 According to Edward Rubin, these concepts of "rule-obedience" and "minimum procedures" are the core requirements of procedural due
28 5
process protection.
In the 1960s, however, the Court turned its attention to welfare
rights28 6 and limitations on the role of due process in protecting government benefits. Three cases decided at the peak of the welfare
rights movement-Sniadach, Goldberg, and Fuentes-balanced the individual's interest against governmental interests to determine the appropriate timing of a deprivation hearing. 28 7 In Board of Regents v.
278 See, e.g., McCormack, supra note 72, at 65; Rubin, supra note 274, at 1051-53; William Van Alstyne, Cracks in "The New Property:". Adjudicative Due Process in the Administrative
State 62 CoRNELL L. REV. 445, 445 (1977).
279 For an extensive analysis of these "loyalty-security cases," see Rubin, supra note 274,
at 1053-60.
280 See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (finding that denial of unemployment compensation to a Seventh Day Adventist who refused to work on Saturday was an
unconstitutional condition on the free exercise of her religion).
281 See, e.g., Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536 (1956) (finding that the Food and Drug Administration had exceeded its authority in applying a loyalty requirement to one of its
inspectors).
282 See, e.g., Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952) (finding that the arbitrariness
of a state law barring individuals from employment solely because of membership in certain organizations violated due process).
283 The Court has described the procedural due process requirement simply as "a
guarantee of fair procedure." Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990).
284 See, e.g., Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). The liberty underlying due
process analysis has been consistently identified by this phrase from Palko as well as by the
concept of liberties "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition" from Moore v.
East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
285 Rubin, supra note 274, at 1105-10.
286
See supra notes 44-58 and accompanying text. For information about the welfare
rights movement and its impact on legal issues at the time, see Michelman, supra note 44;
Charles Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE l.J.
1245 (1965). For a general discussion of the concerns and issues surrounding welfare
rights, see ALFED J. KAHN, SOCIAL POLCV AND SOCIAL SERVICES (1973).
287
See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text. See also Rubin, supra note 274, at
1063-64 & n.103 (detailing the argument that the Court focused not on the applicability
question, but exclusively on the timing issue).
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Roth,288 however, the Court set forth the two-step substantive-procedural due process analysis that first asks whether the state-created entitlement is a protected liberty or property interest, 289 and only then
determines what type of procedures due process requires.2 90 Consequently, inquiry shifted from when a hearing will occur to whether
291
there should be one at all.
Due process theory has thus shifted from its core focus of ensuring adjudicatory legitimacy for vulnerable individual interests. 29 2 The
initial two-step determination set forth in Roth is a categorical analysis
similar to the earlier right-privilege distinction. The difference is the
recognition that intangible interests created by government are "the
modern equivalent of property... [that] sustain the life of the modern man as much as soil did the medieval farmer." 293 Protected property interests are defined in terms of entitlements "created and ...
defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law." 294 Under the Mathews utilitarian

test,295 a court assesses the procedural requirement by weighing government interests, including the efficacy and costs of additional safe2 96
guards, against the individual's interest in the entitlement
Commentators have sharply criticized the Mathews test.2 9 7 First,

the test requires subjective and impressionistic evaluations, asking
288

408 U.S. 564 (1972) (upholding nonrenewal of an untenured faculty member after

concluding that he had neither a protected liberty nor property interest in continued
employment).
289 See, e.g., id. at 569. The Court later explicitly rejected any consideration of the
weight of the interest. "[T]o determine whether due process requirements apply in the
first place, we must look not to the 'weight' but to the nature of the interest at stake." Id. at
570-71. For further discussion of the two-step analysis, see supra notes 71-72, 210 and accompanying text.
290 See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672 (1977); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 577
(1975); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
291
See Rubin, supra note 274, at 1066.
292 Mark Tushnet terms the two-step analysis "wrong and unproductive" due to the
inconsistencies it generates and its reliance on an arbitrary substance-procedure distinction. The deference to state law definitions of property interests means that federally guaranteed due process rights of individuals may be lost in the balance. Mark Tushnet, The
Newer Property: Suggestionfor the Revival of Substantive Due Process,1975 Sup. CT. REv. 261, 262,
267-73.
293 McCormack, supra note 72, at 64.
294 Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.
295 See discussion supra part IV.A.3.
296
Rubin points out that Mathews was initially perceived as "a separate theory for defining minimum procedures in administrative adjudications." Rubin, supra note 274, at 1137.
297
See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculusfor Administrative
Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factorsin Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L.
REv. 28 (1976); Rubin, supra note 274, at 1137 (characterizing Mathews as a test with "debatable" premises, "impractical" methodologies, and "of questionable relevance"). But see
Marc A. Bernstein, Note, Mathews v. EldridgeReviewed: A FairTest on Balance, 67 GEo. LJ.
1407, 1421, 1425-26 (1979) (suggesting that the test is a workable and correct analytic tool
in spite of its subjective determinations and unpredictable results).
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questions that can only be answered with "pervasive indeterminancies. 298 Ranking degrees of deprivation to determine the
weight of a private interest is inherently subjective.2 99 In addition, the
error analysis assigns risks based on a priori assumptions without em300
pirical verification.
The utilitarian test is also problematic because of incomplete balancing. It ignores the societal "dignity" and "equality" values of individual participation in the process. 30 1 Part of the concept of
"minimum procedures" is the idea that "nonalienating" procedures
demonstrate society's respect for an individual's role in governmental
decisionmaking. 3 02 If similar cases do not receive similar protections
or if the decisionmaking process is particularly disadvantageous for
3
particular classes of individuals, then the process is a sham. 30
Finally, the Mathews utilitarian calculus unduly emphasizes administrative convenience. 304 It thus tends to undermine the principal
value of constitutional due process protection-providing fundamentally fair procedures to the individual even when those procedures come at
298 Mashaw, supra note 297, at 48. See also Easterbrook, supra note 210. Easterbrook
contends that the subjective nature of the test argues against the non-interpretivist approach to the Due Process Clause. Due process, he claims, simply means the historical
process accorded by law. The Court's only role in due process analysis is to review the
language and structure of the Constitution, informed by constitutional history. Id. at 91.
In Easterbrook's view, all else is simply "the Justices' substantive preferences." Id. at 115.
This is most evident in the Mathews balancing test which provides for a "judicial rebalancing" of the utilities of a policy decision. Id. at 112. Easterbrook argues:
The formula exalts instrumental objectives. The goal of due process is to
hold as low as possible the sum of two costs: the costs created by erroneous
decisions, including false positives and false negatives, and the costs of administering the procedures. Holding this sum to a minimum maximizes
society's wealth, and the gains may be shared among all affected persons.... If the goal of the [Mathews] formula is the maximization of society's wealth, why did the legislature not enact the preferable procedures in
the first place?
Id. at 110.
299 See Bernstein, supra note 297, at 1411. See also Mathew 0. Tobriner & Harold Cohen, How Much Process is Due?: Parolees and Prisoners, 25 HASrINGS L.J. 801, 802 (1974):
Establishment of a 'pecking order' of the relative severity of disparate deprivations would largely be a subjective task as to which is more serious: dismissal from a job or eviction from one's home, loss of a driver's license or a
misdemeanor conviction for disturbing the peace, the attachment of one's
refrigerator or stigmatization as an 'excessive drinker'?
300
Mashaw, supra note 297, at 42-45. Mashaw illustrates the point with a discussion of
the assumption that medical evidence of disability renders a documentary-based determination of disability for Social Security purposes relatively error free. Undermining the
assumption is evidence that personal exchanges correlate with acceptance of claims. Similarly, administrative decisions based on paper records tend to suffer high reversal rates on
appeal. Id.
301 Id. at 49-54.
302 Id. at 50.
303 Id. at 52-53.
304
This misplaced emphasis on administrative convenience is more troublesome in
the administrative entitlement context than in the civil prejudgment remedy context.
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a cost to the generalpublic.30 5 Balancing group rights (governmental in-

terests measured in terms of administrative costs and convenience)
against individual rights "transforms the right to due process from a
constitutional limit upon the total power of government over the individual into merely an institutional check upon whether the state's procedural policies in fact promote the general welfare."3 0 6 When the
government determines the extent of protection it will grant an individual against generally desirable governmental action solely by using
such an instrumental calculus, it mocks the underlying due process
right to freedom from arbitrary adjudicatory procedures. Because
government intrusions have utility whenever the benefit to the group

even minimally outweighs the impact on the individual, the utilitarian
calculus too easily allows majoritarian perceived needs to overrule the
rule-of-law principle and administrative convenience to erode the
30 7
minimum procedures necessary to fairness.
However, the Court's modification of Mathews in Doehrrepresents
an appropriate shift in the due process calculus in the summary
seizure context.3 08 When the government acts as an arbiter seeking
accommodation between individuals with conflicting rights, it is
proper to ensure minimum procedural safeguards.30 9 Subjective considerations still impinge on the quality of the decisionmaking,3 1 0 but

the public welfare interest no longer weighs heavily against the individual. Instead, the Court compares similar individual interests in de305
Note, Specifying the Procedures Required by Due Process: Towards Limits on the Use of
Interest Balancing,88 HARv. L. REv. 1510, 1511 (1975) [hereinafter Specifying the Procedures).
306 Id. But see Easterbrook, supra note 210, at 111 & n.82 (suggesting that the calculus
is appropriate since it "treats errors in individual cases as a cost but not as an independent
violation of the [due process] guarantee." Errors in the procedure are equitable since they
"do not alter ex ante prospects.").
307 Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 90 n.22 (citation omitted):
[Olne might fairly say of the Bill of Rights in general, and the Due Process
Clause in particular, that they were designed to protect the fragile values of
a vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing concern for efficiency and efficacy that may characterize praiseworthy government officials no less, and
perhaps more, than mediocre ones.
In a recent case, the District of Columbia Circuit noted that "while cost to the government is a factor to be weighed .... it is doubtful that cost alone can ever excuse the failure
to provide adequate process." Propert v. District of Columbia, 948 F.2d 1327, 1335 (D.C.
Cir. 1991).
308
One commentator reviewing the Second Circuit decision (Pinsky v. Duncan, 898
F.2d 852 (2nd Cir. 1990)), contends that the court erred in not directly applying the Mathews balancing test. Martin McCann, Pinsky v. Duncan: Ex ParteAttachment of Real Property
in Connecticut and the Antithetical Restrictions of Due Process, 11 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REv. 201,
203 (1990).
309
See Rubin, supra note 274, at 1139-40; Specifying the Procedures, supra note 305, at
1528-32.
310 For example, Mark Tushnet, commenting on the interest balancing approach implicitly used in Mitchell, notes that the Court provided only a conclusory determination of
the balance with little attention to the primary objections to repossession. Tushnet, supra
note 292, at 285.
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termining the appropriate timing for a hearing before a neutral
officer on the merits of the attachment. Equality values are affirmed
because the comparison is between similar debtor and creditor interests rather than between the group and the individual, except in those
few cases of legitimate public emergency.3 1 ' Although ex parte proceedings deny the defendant a participatory opportunity at the outset,
the immediate postattachment proceeding does satisfy the dignity requirements of due process in some circumstances.
In addition, the Mathews-Doehr test establishes the relationship
among the factors (such as preexisting creditor interest, exigent circumstances, and the various procedural safegnards) that are relevant
in determining the minimum procedural requirements.3 1 2 Although
the balancing process is inevitably subjective, it serves as a reasonable
tool for accommodating the conflicting demands inherent in private
disputes over property ownership. The resulting constitutional decisions resolve particular questions of law, providing not a categorical
checklist but an archetype against which lower courts can measure
31 3
similar cases.
The test thus substantially effectuates the core procedural value
of ensuring adequate process in the summary seizure context, and
thereby advances the goal of granting the individual freedom from
arbitrary adjudicative procedure.
4.

The "More Vulnerable" Rule

By providing the unifying principle that expresses the procedural
due process value of "minimum procedures," 3 14 the Mathews-Doehrtest
311
Special protections must apply when the government is the plaintiff. Only governmental interests that meet a strict compelling need test should override the protections the

Constitution guarantees an individual. Thus, the "extraordinary circumstances" exception
must remain truly extraordinary if the core procedural due process values are to be
upheld.
312
See Van Alstyne, supra note 278, at 487 (suggesting that the procedural due process
right to "freedom from arbitrary adjudicative procedures" is a substantive element of personal liberty).
313 The Sniadach decisions apply procedural due process interest balancing in a way
that establishes guideline decisions defining focal pockets of attachment process law. The
result is a constitutional chart of archetypes for the prejudgment remedy territory. The
constitutional process resembles the Court's ambling shifts through choice of law issues in
Erik R.R v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) and its progeny. See KEviN M. CLERMOrNT, CrVL
PROCEDURE 240-45 (2d ed. 1988). Clermont suggests that the Court's role in constitutional
analysis is "to create a series of general rules that soundly make the choice between state
and federal law for all the common situations." Id. at 240.
314 Judge Richard Posner described this function of the modified Mathews test in Penn
Cent. Corp. v. United States RR. Vest Corp., 955 F.2d 1158, 1163 (7th Cir. 1992): "[The
Mathews] test is-an alternative way of... generating... exceptions to the requirement of
predeprivation process. Instead of enumerating discrete exceptions, such as emergency or
infeasibility, a court in applying the test asks whether, all things considered, predeprivation
process is a reasonable requirement to impose."
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explains the exception branches of the prejudgment remedy doctrinal
tree. 315 A defendant's interest in the property subject to attachment
may be so vulnerable due to lack of safeguards that it cannot be outweighed by the plaintiff's interest in summary procedure. Similarly,
the defendant may belong to a class of individuals for whom the decisionmaking process is particularly disadvantageous, and thus the defendant's interest becomes more vulnerable. Only if the plaintiff's
need is greater than the defendant's vulnerability may the plaintiff
avail itself of summary procedures to repossess the defendant's property. This "more vulnerable" principle can be expressed as follows:
IFF

it's need
A's vulnerability

> 1, then ic may use summary procedures

In effect, the Mathews-Doehr test places the importance of the
plaintiff's interest on the scale opposite considerations of the vulnerability of the defendant's interest, in a context where there is "presumptively greater weight"3 16 to the interests of the defendant in
avoiding summary deprivation and in having an opportunity to participate in the decisionmaking process prior to any official action.
Genuine emergency or a preexisting, legally coguizable interest contribute to the importance of the plaintiff's interests. Brutal need,
gaps in the statutory safeguards, a fault-based underlying claim, or inadequate remedies for wrongful deprivation make the defendant's interest more vulnerable.
Thus, the extraordinary circumstances of a public crisis may tip
the scale heavily in the plaintiff's favor. The government's summary
seizure of warehoused food unfit for human consumption in North
American Cold Storage v. City of Chicago3 17 is constitutional, even though
the owner did not benefit from predeprivation notice and hearing.
Such emergency situations that require prompt government action to
protect the public are archetypal situations in which the government
may act summarily against the individual's interests. In nonadjudicatory contexts, this archetype is readily accepted. For example, even
when the individual affected suffers serious loss, fire officials may decide to sacrifice a building to prevent a fire from ultimately consum-

315

See supra notes 305-06 and accompanying text.

316 Kay & Lubin, supra note 4, at 723: "[T]he due process clause is an endorsement of
the interest of the party in possession. The clause is an injunction against disturbing the
existing balance of property interests unless valid legal reasons are shown in an appropriate procedure."
317

211 U.S. 306 (1908). See generally Karen Nelson Moore, ProceduralDue Process in

Quasi in Rem Actions after Shaffer v. Heitner, 20 WM. & MARY L. REv. 157, 208-15 (1978)
(discussing the cases listed in Fuentes).
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ing many other structures.3 1 8 In adjudicatory contexts, 19
extraordinary circumstances in the narrow confines of an urgent public crisis preempt the individual's right to freedom from arbitrary procedures. The courts must, therefore, be especially vigilant to ensure
that the compelling need principle is not eroded by allowing summary
procedures for lesser emergencies when other, less intrusive means of
3 20
addressing the problem would suffice.
Similarly, the brutal need that accompanies deprivations of wages
or basic necessities presumptively tips the scale in the defendant's
favor against summary seizure. Garnishment proceedings that risk
taking an individual's means of livelihood should be subject to prior
notice and hearing to provide the defendant with a better opportunity
to avoid the deprivation or to arrange another means of settling the
debt.
In the "broad, gray middle range... where the interests of the
parties are in relative balance,"3 2 1 the plaintiff must have a legally cognizable preexisting interest and the defendant must be protected by
sufficient safeguards to tip the scale in favor of the plaintiff. Thus, in
Fuentes, where the plaintiff merely had a security interest in the consumer goods and there was no provision for judicial review of the process, replevin was unconstitutional.3 22 And in Di-Chem, although the
defendant was a commercial entity not subject to brutal need, its interest was still vulnerable because of the lack of safeguards,3 23 while the
plaintiff had no preexisting interest in the assets subject to garnishment. In both cases, predeprivation process was required. In Mitchell
however, the statutorily created vendor's lien elevated the importance
of the plaintiff's interest, while the range of procedural safeguards it
provided reduced the vulnerability of the defendant's interests
324
enough to allow ex parte seizure.
Doehr involved a temporary encumbrance on real estate. Even
though the attachment lien was nonpossessory and only affected mar318 See, e.g., RicHRD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ToRTs 57-60 (5th ed. 1990)
(discussing the public necessity defense); W. PAGE KEE oN ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON
THE Lw OF ToRTs § 24, at 147 (5th ed. 1984) (same).
319 Edward Rubin argues that the phrase "life, liberty or property" should not be interpreted as specific types of interests, but rather as encompassing adjudication of interests in
general. The two-step analysis is wrong, because any adjudication affecting an individual
interest is subject to due process protection. Its procedures must follow the rule-obedience
principle and must meet the minimum procedural requirements for constitutional accepted procedures of its type. See Rubin, supra note 274, at 1095-96, 1105-10.
320 See, e.g., Specifying the Procedures,supra note 305, at 1533-34, 1536-37 (discussing the
need for additional measures of procedural fairness in contexts where the state acts against
individuals for the public welfare, such as in civil forfeitures).
321 Nickles, supra note 4, at 636.
322 See discussion supra part I.B.
323 See discussion supra part I.D.
324 See discussion supra part I.C.
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ketability, predeprivation notice and hearing were required. 3 25 The
plaintiff's sole interest in the property-created by the attachment to
secure a potential tort judgment-was de minimis. 326 On the other
hand, ex parte attachment based on the likelihood of success on the
merits of a tort case creates significant vulnerability for the defendant's interest. 32 7 Thus, even though the defendant's interest is much
less significant than that of others facing deprivation, these factors require predeprivation process.
The resulting procedural due process relationships in the summary seizure context can be portrayed as follows:
t
increasing
importance
of the

extraordinary 7c interest
A's brutal need

plaintiff's
interest

I

inadequate
safeguards
de minimis 7t interest

increasing vulnerability of the defendant's interests >
Attachment without prior notice and hearing is constitutional only
for those cases that fall within the portion of the chart above the line.
B.

Incorporating Quasi in Rem Attachment Jurisdiction

An important question that remained unanswered by the Sniadach tetrad and cases addressing jurisdictional due process requirements was the continuing viability of attachment jurisdiction. 328 The
"more vulnerable" rule, however, also provides a useful analytic approach to attachment jurisdiction. Attachment jurisdiction is a subtype of quasi in rem territorial jurisdiction 329 by which the plaintiff
looks to the defendant's subject property to discharge a claim against
325
326

Doehr, 501 U.S. at 11-12.
Id. at 16.

327

Id. at 13-14.
See, e.g., JACK FRIENDENTHAL ET AL., CivR PROCEDURE § 3.21 at 174 (1985); Baker,

328

supra note 247; Note, Quasiin Rem JurisdictionandDue ProcessRequirements, 82 YALE L.J. 1023
(1973) [hereinafter Quasi in Rem].
329 Territorial jurisdiction defines a forum court's authority to adjudicate a claim in
terms of the geographic relationships among the parties, the forum, and the litigation.
CLERMoNT, supra note 313, at 147. See generally id. at 146-60 (explaining the concept and
categories of territorial jurisdiction); FRIUDENTHAL, supra note 328, § 3.1 (discussing the
concept of territorial jurisdiction).
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the defendant that is unrelated to the property itself.33 0 Traditionally,
the existence of property within the forum state gave the state sufficient power to attach the property as a means of acquiring territorial
33
jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim. '
One of the examples the Fuentes Court chose to illustrate extraordinary circumstances3 3 2 was Ownbey v. Morgan,3 33 an early case
upholding quasi in rem attachmentjurisdiction.3 3 4 The Ownbey Court
upheld the procedure based on its "time-honored" use even in the
Colonial period.3 3 5 Fuentes seemed to adopt that rationale, suggesting
that attachment jurisdiction represented "a most basic and important
public interest" 3 3 6 More recent developments, however, cast consid33 7
erable doubt on the continuing validity of attachment jurisdiction.
The general requirements for procedural due process in assuming jurisdiction over a defendant or her property were set in two pivThere are two types of territorial jurisdiction based on the state's power over things
rather than persons: in rem and quasi in rem. See CLERMoNT, supra note 313, at 146. In
rem proceedings settle title against all possible claimants and include actions for forfeiture,
alimony, escheat, wills, condemnation, registration of title to land, and action to quiet tifle.
Quasi in rem proceedings, on the other hand, are brought against a particular defendant's
interest in particular property. Subtype One involves a related, preexisting interest such as
that entailed in liens, mortgages, contracts to purchase land, actions to partition an estate,
or adverse possession. Subtype Two looks to the subject property to discharge an unrelated claim. See, e.g., FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 328, §§ 3.2-3.11, §§ 3.14-3.18 (1985).
330 CLERMoNT, supra note 313, at 147.
331
See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 726-27 (1877).
332
Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 91 n.23.
333
256 U.S. 94 (1921) (allowing attachment to secure jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant in state court).
334
The characterization of attachment jurisdiction as an extraordinary circumstance
stems from the Ownbey Court's own description of the process:
[A] property owner who absents himself from the territorial jurisdiction of
a State, leaving his property within it, must be deemed ex necessitate to consent that the State may subject such property to judicial process to answer
demands made against him in his absence, according to any practicable
method that reasonably may be adopted.
Ownbey, 256 U.S. at 111.
It should be noted, however, that Ownbey was decided in the context of a different
concept of territorial jurisdiction. See Moore, supra note 317, at 214-15. Under Pennoyer,
states were "exclusively powerful" over persons and things within their boundaries, but
"absolutely powerless" over persons and things outside those boundaries. FRiEr.m'TA.,
supra note 328, at 100.
335
Ownbey, 256 U.S. at 102-08. "A procedure customarily employed, long before the
Revolution, in the commercial metropolis of England, and generally adopted by the States
as suited to their circumstances and needs, cannot be deemed inconsistent with due process of law .... " Id. at 111.
336 Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 91 n.23.
337 The use of attachment jurisdiction "usually is superfluous" due to growth of state
long-arm statutes providing in personam jurisdiction over nonresidents. FRIEDENTHAL,
supra note 328, at 152. See also Quasi in Ren, supra note 328, at 1034 (suggesting that
attachment jurisdiction should be restricted to situations of genuine necessity).
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otal Supreme Court cases. In InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington,3 38
the Court established a reasonableness test for in personam jurisdiction: a defendant must have "minimum contacts" with the forum state
that satisfy "'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice'"
before the state can exercise authority over him. 339 In Shaffer v. Heitner,340 the Court extended InternationalShoe to cover all assertions of
territorial jurisdiction. 34 1 Procedural due process concerus weighed
heavily against the historical and expedience rationales supporting attachment jurisdiction 34 2 since "the only role played by the property is
to provide the basis for bringing the defendant into court." 43
Attachment jurisdiction survives Shaffer, however, in those situations in which other connections with the state make the jurisdiction
reasonable. 3 44 These include instances in which (1) the state has in
personam jurisdiction over the defendant, 345 (2) the property secures
the judgment for a suit in another jurisdiction where in personam
jurisdiction is available, 346 or (3) the property is the basis for the en347
forcement of a judgment already rendered.
Moreover, in Mullane v. CentralHanover Bank & Trust Co., 348 the
Court faced another jurisdictional question not explicitly resolved by
Shaffer.349 The defendant Central Bank brought an action for judicial
settlement of its accounts as trustee of a common trust fund established under New York banking law. 350 The accounting would seal
and terminate "every right which beneficiaries would otherwise have
against the trust company... for improper management of the common trust fund during the period covered by the accounting."351 The
Surrogate Court addressed personal rights that were being settled in
what would normally be considered an in personam action, 352 yet the
court also exercised in rem jurisdiction over the res of the trust fund
338 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (holding that territorialjurisdiction requires minimal contacts
between the party and the forum state that satisfy traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice).
339 Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
340 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
341 Id. at 212.
342 Id. at 209-12.
343 Id. at 209.
344 See id. at 207-12.
345 See the discussion of sufficient contacts in id. at 207.
346 Id. at 210.
347 Id.
348 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
349 See Moore, supra note 317, at 180-91.
350 Mullane, 339 U.S. at 309.
351 Id. at 311.
352 Id.
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itself.35 3 Noting the confusion of ancient classificatory schemes,3 54 the

Court held that jurisdiction could be exercised over the unascertainable beneficiaries: "the vital interest of the State in bringing any issues
as to its fiduciaries to a final settlement" was dispositive.3 55 No other
forum was available to settle the accounts established under the state's
56
laws. 3
Shaffer and Mullane together suggest that the reasonableness test
for territorial jurisdiction should permit states to adjudicate claims
when there is no other forum and adjudication is sufficiently important to the state's interests.3 57 Otherwise, because in personam
jurisdiction is unavailable, attachment jurisdiction should be
358
unconstitutional.
1.

ConvenienceJurisdiction

The "more vulnerable" rule developed in the prejudgment remedy context also provides a unifying rationale for analyzing the constitutionality of attachment jurisdiction. Run-of-the-mill seizures for
jurisdictional purposes are unconstitutional under Shaffer and under
Mathews-Doehr procedural due process analysis. When the plaintiff
seeks to force a nonresident defendant into court by attaching property, the plaintiff's interest-mere personal convenience-is presumptively unimportant.3 59 On the other hand, the impact on the
defendant is significant. Hauled into court because of his property,
the defendant faces suit on an unrelated claim. Such "convenience
jurisdiction" falls outside the range of acceptability under either the
InternationalShoe reasonableness standard or the Mathews-Doehrvulnerability analysis. As in Doehr, the plaintiff's interest is too insignificant
to subject the defendant to attachment proceedings.
353
"Judicial proceedings to settle fiduciary accounts have been sometimes termed in
rem, or more indefinitely quasi in rem, or more vaguely still, 'in the nature of a proceeding
in rem' It is not readily apparent how the courts of New York did or would classify the

present proceeding. ..

" I& at 312.

"The legal recognition and rise in economic importance of incorporeal or intangible forms of property have upset the ancient simplicity of property law and the clarity of its
distinctions, while new forms of proceedings have confused the old procedural classification." RL
55 Id. at 313.
356
[T]he interest of each state in providing means to close trusts that exist by
the grace of its laws and are administered under the supervision of its
courts is so insistent and rooted in custom as to establish beyond doubt the
right of its courts to determine the interests of all claimants ....
Id.
357
See Moore, supra note 317, at 226-30; Quasi in Rem, supra note 328, at 1032.
358
See supra notes 343-47 and accompanying text. See also Moore, supra note 317.
359 Conveniencejurisdiction thus falls within the shaded portion of"de minimis plaintiff interest" on the chart supra p. 1647.
354
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Necessity Jurisdiction

On the other hand, given the continuing viability of exigency in
determining the weight given to the plaintiff's claim in the Sniadach
quintad, "necessity jurisdiction" should be constitutionally acceptable.
In the Mullane example, finalizing accounting records is important to
trustees and to the states that set the framework for the trusteeship.
Such cases satisfy the three factors defining an extraordinary circumstance:3 60 there is a compelling need to maintain healthy financial
institutions, a demand for prompt action at intervals that allow the
institutions to make adjustments and continue functioning, and appropriate state procedural controls. Just as the "more vulnerable"
rule allows attachment in cases of public emergencies at the upper
end of the scale of plaintiff need, the same principle supports attachment jurisdiction in cases of necessity where no alternative means
exists to adjudicate the interests at stake.
3.

Parallelin PersonamJurisdiction

In the instances where attachment jurisdiction unambiguously
survives Shaffer, the defendant is subject to in personamjurisdiction of
the primary adjudicating court-either the attaching state's court, a
prior adjudicating state's court (in cases where a judgment is being
enforced), or a simultaneously adjudicating state's court in cases
where the attached property in one state provides security for a suit in
another state. The availability of in personamjurisdiction assures that
there are adequate procedural safeguards. The plaintiff's right to
pursue a judicial resolution or enforce a judgment is therefore predominant in the balance, favoring availability of attachment
jurisdiction.
Thus, while exparteattachment to acquire jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, without more, is clearly unconstitutional, quasi in
rem attachment jurisdiction is reasonable when the plaintiff's needs
are paramount and the defendant's protections sufficient. At the middle part of the vulnerability scale, where another forum in a related
matter has in personam jurisdiction over the defendant, and at the
upper end of the scale, where the appropriate showing of compelling
need, urgency, and procedural control can be made, attachmentjurisdiction satisfies the vulnerability analysis requirements proposed for
3 61
due process assessments of prejudgment remedies.
360
361

See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
See Quasi in Ren, supra note 328, at 1035.

The decision in Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990) (ScaliaJ., majority)
(upholding transient jurisdiction based primarily on arguments from historical pedigree)
suggests that the Court will continue to emphasize tradition as the underlying due process
value. See generally Hayward D. Reynolds, The Concept ofJurisdiction: Conflicting Legal Ideolo-
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CONCLUSION

Procedural due process analysis developed primarily in the administrative context with a utilitarian balancing test as its primary tool.
A significant change emerged, however, with the Court's 1991 decision in Connecticut v. Doehr. The modified Mathews-Doehr test represents an explicit formulation of the government's duty to provide
adjudicatory legitimacy in accommodating conflicting interests in private disputes. Balancing private interests serves as a tool to establish
procedural archetypes-cases that demarcate the minimum procedural protections necessary for specific types of attachment proceedings. The result is a "more vulnerable" rule that provides a unifying
explanation of the Sniadach quintad decisions grounded in procedural due process principles. The application of the rule to quasi in
rem attachment jurisdiction demonstrates the consistency of procedural due process requirements across the spectrum of attachment
actions.
Linda Beale

gies and Per-istentFormalistSubversion, 18 HAsTNGS CONST. L.Q. 819 (1991) (suggesting that
the Bumham decision represents a return to a conservative, formalist due process jurisprudence). An alternative analysis of Doehrshows the Court marching enthusiastically to the
drumbeat of tradition flavored by a heavy dose of federalism. In extending procedural due
process protection to at least some temporary encumbrances of real property, the Court
has drawn a parallel to recent Takings Clause cases that suggest limits to states' ability to
restrict property use under the police power without compensation. See, e.g., Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct 2886 (1992) (Scalia, J., majority) (stating that
temporary deprivation of all economic use of land constitutes a taking requiring compensation by the state). The result is a renewed emphasis on vested rights, carried into the
attachment context by the importance given "preexisting creditor interests" in determining the required procedural protections. Such interests count more than the brutal need
that individuals may face, for as the discussion of the cases after Sniadach demonstrated,
the Court had rejected explicit consideration of grievous losses in the calculus.
The repeated references to historical procedures for attachment, replevin, and garnishment in the Sniadach quintad suggest a willingness to rely on historical pedigree. Justice Black's dissent in Sniadach, if taken to heart by the Court, would support statutory
provisions providing little protection to the debtor simply because creditor remedies bave
long been available. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.

